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ABSTRACT

The work contained within this dissertation is a textual exegesis of Abelard’s
ethics. The goal is to elucidate Abelard’s sort of intentionalism given his use of
“intention” within his wider corpus, the grammatical and syntactical patterns in his
prose, and Abelard’s own interests, biography, and situation as a twelfth-century
monastic figure. As a result, this project should be understood as a history of
philosophy dissertation. I am not attempting to build upon Abelard’s ideas but to
clarify them. This is not to say that building upon Abelard’s ideas is not a worthwhile
project. It is merely to say that doing so is beyond the scope of this project.
I found it necessary to clarify Abelard’s ideas about ethics because I found that
many interpretations of his ethical work were either lacking or wildly incorrect. This
has much to do, I think, with the history of Abelard’s reception as a theologian. When
Abelard’s ethic was first received, it was understood to be dangerously subjectivist. In
other words, he was understood to be advocating a sort of subjective relativism. In
response to this gross misinterpretation of his work, contemporary readers resolved
that Abelard maintained a rather explicit observance of objective moral truth.
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Now, neither the subjectivist account nor the objectivist account gives the full
story of what, exactly, Abelard is up to in his Scito te Ipsum. Though some have
delivered fairly mitigated assessments of Abelard’s ethic, there is a larger theological
story that serves as the foundational lens through which his work must be
understood—one that, I argue, has not been sufficiently considered. In this dissertation
I contextualize Abelard’s Scito te Ipsum within his theological commitments and arrive
at a very nuanced account of his ethical contributions to the history of philosophy. In
short, Abelard contends that caritas renders a subject morally praiseworthy. This is a
claim that is rather orthodox within the scope of the Christian ethical tradition and the
twelfth century more specifically.
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A NOTE ON THE TEXTS

Here I have included the Latin critical edition followed by the most trusted (or only)
English translation of the main primary texts I am using. If any amendments to the
translations are made, I indicate as much in the footnotes.
Collationes, A critical edition of the Latin as well as an English translation is found in
Marenbon, John & Orlandi, Giovanni. Collationes. (Clarendon Press, 2001).
Commentaria in Epistolam Pauli ad Romanos, ed. E.M. Buytaert, CCCM 11 (Turnhout,
1969)
Trans. Cartwright, Stephen. (Washington: Catholic University Press, 2012).
Confessions, ed. James J. O’Donnell, (Clarendon Press, 1992).
Trans. Thomas Williams (Hackett, 2019).
Historia Calamitatum et Epistolae 1-7
Epistola 01: Historia Calamitatum
ed. J. Monfrin, Abelard: Historia Calamitatum, J. Vrin: Paris 1978, 62-109.
Epistola 02: Heloise to Abelard
ed. J. T. Muckle, Mediaeval Studies 15 (1953), 68-73.
Epistola 03: Abelard to Heloise
ed. J. T. Muckle, Mediaeval Studies 15 (1953), 73-77.
Epistola 04: Heloise to Abelard
ed. J. T. Muckle, Mediaeval Studies 15 (1953), 77-82.
Epistola 05: Abelard to Heloise
ed. J. T. Muckle, Mediaeval Studies 15 (1953), 83-94.
Epistola 06: Heloise to Abelard, on religious life
ed. J. T. Muckle, Mediaeval Studies 17 (1955), 241-253.
Epistola 07: Abelard to Heloise, on religious life
ed. J. T. Muckle, Mediaeval Studies 17 (1955), 253-281.
Trans. William Levitan, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2007)

v

Scito te Ipsum, A critical edition of the Latin as well as an English translation is found
in Luscombe, David. Peter Abelard’s Ethics. (Clarendon Press, 1971).
Sermones, Petrus Abaelardus opera, edd. Victor Cousin, adiuuante C. Jourdain et E.
Despois. Tomus prior. (Paris, 1849), reprint (Georg Olms Verlag, 1970).
Sic et non, edd. B.B. Boyer and R. McKeon, Peter Abailard, Sic et Non: A Critical Edition
(Chicago University Press, 1977).
Trans. Priscilla Throop. (Medieval MS, 2001).
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A CHRONOLOGY OF ABELARD’S LIFE AND MAJOR WORKS
I have detailed a timeline of Abelard’s life dates of composition for the major works I
will be using as part of this project. The dating of the events and works is taken from
Constant Mews and John Marenbon.

1079
c. 1100
c. 1102/3
1105-1108
1108
c. 1108

1109

1113

c. 1115
1117-1121

c. 1117/8
c. 1120s

Abelard is born in Le Pallet, Brittany
Abelard goes to Paris to study with William of Champeaux (Mews,
Abelard and Heloise, 28)
Abelard establishes school at the royal palace at Melun with help of
Stephen of Garlande’s brothers (Mews, Abelard and Heloise, 30)
Abelard returns to Brittany (Tours or Lorie Valley) and studied dialectic
apart from William of Champeaux (Mews, Abelard and Heloise, 30)
Abelard returns to Paris (Mews, Abelard and Heloise, 30)
Debate on universals with William of Champeaux; Abelard removed
from position at Notre Dame cathedral school- formerly William's post
before he resigned. Abelard returned to teaching at Melun, but soon
moved his school to the Montagne. Ste.-Genevieve (Mews, Abelard and
Heloise, 31)
Abelard produces first glosses on dialectic Commentary on Porphyry's
Isagoge, Aristotle’s Categories & Periermeneias (Mews, Abelard and
Heloise, 32)
Abelard goes to Laon to listen to Anselm’s lectures and returns to Paris
shortly thereafter, unimpressed (Mews, Abelard and Heloise, 37). Abelard
then receives teaching position at cathedral school of Notre Dame
Abelard meets Heloise
Abelard teaches at St. Denis. During this time, he begins the Logica
“Ingredientibus,” though we are not sure when he finished it (Mews,
Abelard and Heloise, 82)
Abelard drafts the Dialectia (Mews, Abelard and Heloise, 44)
Theologia Christiana (early 1120s)
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1120

1121
1121
1122-1127.
1127

1131
1128
c. 1132
Before c. 1134
c. 1135
1136/7
c. 1138
c.1138-1140

c. 1140

May 25, 1141
July, 1141
c. 1141

Abelard writes letter to Bishop of Paris explaining he wants to refute
Roselin’s argument about the Trinity (which was accused of tritheism)
which was more wide-ranging than St. Anselm’s De incarnatione Verbi.
Abelard accused of heresy at the Council of Soissons
Sic et Non
Abelard builds oratory, the Holy Trinity, in the County of Champagne.
It is later called “Paraclete.” (Marenbon, Phil. Of Peter Abelard, 20)
Peter Abelard gave up the school that he had established around the
oratory of the Paraclete in order to take a position as abbot of St.-Gildasde-Ruys, in Brittany (Mews, Abelard & Heloise, 145)
Heloise takes over the oratory of the Paraclete (Mews, Abelard and
Heloise, 148)
Tractatus de intellectibus, written before this time
Historia calamitatum (Mews, Abelard and Heloise, 8)
Commentary on Romans (Marenbon, introduction to Collationes, xx)
Theologia Scholarium
Abelard’s introductory lectures on dialectic (Mews, Abelard and Heloise,
12)
Scito teipsum (Marenbon, introduction to Collationes, xxi)
Commentary on the Hexaemeron, history of female monasticism (Ep. 7),
rule for the Paraclete (Ep. 8), and Problemata, answers to various
questions raised by the Bible. (Marenbon, introduction to Collationes,
xxi)
Bernard circulates letter bashing Abelard (Mews, Abelard and Heloise,
10). Traditional date of composition for Collationes, but recently
Marenbon Orlandi, and Buytaert all argue for a date between 1123 and
1135, most definitely before 1140 (Marendon, introduction to Collationes,
xxxii). This, in my opinion seems correct. I would argue for an earlier
date, closer to 1123, considering the lack of precision and utilization of
various terms that are articulated more precisely in Scito te ipsum.
Council of Sens (Mews, Abelard and Heloise, 11)
Pope Innocent II condemns Abelard a heretic, condemned to silence
(Mews, Abelard and Heloise, 11)
Rule for the Paraclete & “Our Institutions” in a single manuscript
(Mews, Abelard and Heloise, 13)
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INTRODUCTION
I.

Thesis
In the last few decades Abelard’s ethics has generated substantial interest in

secondary philosophical literature. Most seem to agree on two things: First, that
Abelard’s ethics is “intentionalist.” Second, that Abelard’s ethics is Kantian. The first of
these claims—that Abelard’s ethics is intentionalist—is well and good depending upon
one’s description of “intentionalist.” Much of this dissertation will be aimed at spelling
out, exactly, what one ought to mean by such an assertion. The second claim—that
Abelard’s ethics is Kantian—is not, in my view, defensible no matter how you define
the Kantian descriptor. The aim in elucidating what sort of intentionalism Abelard
defends in Scito te Ipsum will be to challenge the Kantian association. My central thesis,
then, is that Abelard’s ethics is not Kantian, in that it does not deny the importance of
affect or inclinations in ascribing moral praise or merit.
My argument to demonstrate this thesis will proceed in four parts: First, I will
examine the Augustinian roots underlying Abelard’s understanding of intentionality
and how this informs his reading of the Gospel. This is a noted gap in the literature, as
indicated by Margaret Cameron: “Further research into Abelard’s theory of intention
ought to pursue the connection with Augustine’s notion of intention found in many of
1

his writings.”1 Second, I will show how these Augustinian roots and theological
concerns ought to impact the way in which we understand Abelard’s use of intention in
his ethics. Next, I will show that Abelard’s ethical project is not one of pure reason, that
it does not deny the importance of the passions or the emotions in ascribing moral
praise and, on this basis, it is not proto-Kantian. Lastly, I will show the unity of
Abelard’s theological and ethical project by considering his atonement theory.
In order to accomplish this task, to demonstrate the veracity of my thesis, it will
be especially important to strip the modern bias we bring to our assessment of
Abelard’s prose. Because intention is the central theme of this dissertation, I believe it to
be the most important word to consider. Intention has a plethora of meanings in
ordinary language. I think the failure to understand and correctly outline Abelard’s
ethics is largely indebted to this reality. Gone unchecked, or without careful evaluation,
talking about “Abelard’s intentionalism” is a phrase devoid of meaning, much like the
daunting echo of “Cartesian dualism” that reverberates in philosophy departments
throughout the Anglo-Saxon world. So then, let us check and evaluate what we, as
moderns, mean when we utilize this word. Elizabeth Anscombe’s Intention is a good
place to begin because she posits no theory of intentionality per se, but merely an
assessment of how this word is utilized in it’s ordinary, Western, and most importantly,

Cameron, Margaret. “Abelard (and Heloise?) On Intention.” American Catholic Philosophical
Quarterly, no. 2 (2007): 337.
1

2

modern, use. I continue to return to Anscombe’s exposition of intention as an exegetical
tool throughout my dissertation. So, it is important to begin considering it here; though
I will revisit the following explanation when necessary.
Anscombe brings to light three intimately related descriptions of intention:
intentional action, intention for future, and intention-with-which.2 If I were to say, “I
intentionally hit the ball,” I would be describing an intentional action. Intention under
this description corresponds to a meaning-to perform action x. In other words, it is a
voluntary act. Intention-for-future implies a plan for a future action. For instance, if I
were to say, “I intend to get a drink after work,” the word “intention” implies that I am
planning to have a drink once I am off work. Finally, an intention with which is an
agent’s reason or purpose with which they act. If I were to ask Peter, “Why did you buy
Lucy flowers?” he may respond by providing the reason or purpose he did so—an
intention-with which. Perhaps it was to let her know he was thinking about her or to
congratulate her for a recent promotion. In any case, an intention-with-which answers the
question “why?”
These are the presuppositions we, as moderns, bring to our assessment of a text
which includes the word “intention.” Often, we do so with little care to distinguish
which of these three we presume. This seems to be the case with much of the secondary
literature on Abelard. Though scholars widely agree that intention is the central theme

2

See: Anscombe, G.E.M. Intention, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957).

3

of the Abelardian ethic, there is little agreement on what constitutes his intentionalism.
However, all descriptions are equally modern in that they appeal to or utilize one of
these descriptions Anscombe outlines. Intentionality is a meaning -to, a plan-to, or a
reason-for. We must remember though, despite eager historians who are dire to make
Abelard the unsung hero of the Middle Ages: Abelard is not a modern.3 As such,
Abelard’s vocabulary is not our vocabulary. In order to understand Abelard, we must
understand his vocabulary—that of a 12th century philosopher and devoted monk. This
will require a brief exposition of who Abelard was as a philosopher and monastic
figure. In the interest of space, I will keep these biographical details short, only
considering those that will be particularly pertinent in coming to understand his ethical
account.
II.

Brief Biographical Notes
Historia Calamitatum, Abelard’s own autobiography, has sustained the attention

of scholars for centuries. Not only is it fascinating for being the only text of its kind
during the twelfth century, but it is crucial to any serious study of Abelard’s thought.
Though many have argued over the historicity of various details contained within it,

In many anthologies of Christian thought Abelard is painted as a precursor of the modern
period. This, I think, compounds the proto-Kantian reading of Abelard. For instance, take Chad Meister
and J.B. Stumps reading of Abelard in Christian Thought: A Historical Introduction: “In fact, his
methodology sounds more at home in the Modern period after Descartes than in medieval
scholasticism.” Because of one line in Abelard’s Prologue to Sic et Non, Meister and Stump claim that
Abelard has a “method of doubting” which clearly draws a connection to Descartes. It is quite the stretch.
3

4

Historia Calamitatum gives a clear picture of one thing: how Abelard perceives himself.4
Historical precision aside, this is perhaps the most helpful tool in understanding the
philosophical thought of a given thinker. A few things about Abelard’s self-perception
become apparent in any exegesis of the text and continuously surface in the secondary
literature. First, Abelard thinks rather highly of himself and his intellectual ability.5 “My
reputation in dialectic began to spread until, slowly but surely, it eclipsed the fame of
all my old schoolmates and even my master himself,”6 he says. Abelard sprinkles these
revealing gems throughout Historia Calamitatum, always suggestive that his logical
acumen far exceeds those within his midst.7
It also becomes clear that Abelard believes he was the victim of jealous rage. This
goes hand in hand with his elevated sense of self. He recounts unfair trials,
assassination attempts (by poisoning the Eucharist no less!), and unfounded (and

For instance, Bernard of Clairvaux tells Abelard’s story quite differently.
See: Mews, Constant. Abelard and Heloise. (Oxford University Press, 2005) and Marenbon, John.
The Philosophy of Peter Abelard. (Cambridge University Press, 1997).
6 Historia Calamitatum, trans. William Levitan in Abelard & Heloise: The Letters and Other Writings.
(Hackett, 2007), 3. All Translations of Historia Calamitatum and the canonical letter exchange between
Abelard and Heloise will follow this translation. Any modifications of Levitan’s translation will be
indicated in subsequent footnotes. When I included the Latin or modify the translations, I am using
critical edition from J.T. Muckle, “The Personal Letters Between Abelard and Heloise, “Medieval Studies 15
(1953), 47-94. This is also what Levitan utilized for his own translation.
7 Though Bernard of Clairvaux is not impressed with Abelard’s intellect, he is in agreement that
Abelard perceives himself to be wildly intelligent. He claims, “We have in France an old teacher turned
into a new theologian, who in his early days amused himself with dialectics, and now gives utterance to
wild imaginations upon the Holy Scriptures. He is endeavoring again to quicken false opinions, long ago
condemned and put to rest, not only his own, but those of others; and is adding fresh ones as well,” in
Letter LX, “Against Certain Heads of Abelard’s Heresies,” in The Complete Works of S. Bernard, Abbot of
Clairvaux, trans. Joannes Mabillon, (John Hodges, 1904).
4
5

5

founded) rumors spread by those seeking nothing but his demise. On the surface,
Historia Calamitatum looks like one, long explanation of the character assassination
Abelard has suffered at the hands of envious peers, clergy, and teachers. Indeed, this
seems to be the reasoning behind the title Historia Calamitatum: he believes the text to be
a history of calamities that he has suffered as a result of his popularity and logical
prowess. Both of these observations—that Abelard perceives himself both genius and
martyr—are accurate. However, I think there is a telling story beneath these explicit
professions of egotism and martyrdom that help us understand his emphasis and
interest in intention.
The way in which Abelard tells the story of his own character assassination
reveals his disgust with clerical hypocrisy.8 He calls this out again and again. He is
genuinely repulsed by the corruption and debauchery within the abbey walls. While
Abelard was abbot at The abbey of Saint Gildas of Rhuys, he insists that the monks
were “notoriously corrupt beyond control.”9 He even claims that he was unable to hold
them accountable, for if he did he feared his own life: “If I tried to force them to the life
of rule they professed, I was sure I would be murdered.”10 He says something similar
about the monks at St. Denis: “Nearly every monk who had been there before me

In “Life, milieu, and intellectual contexts” in the Cambridge Companion to Abelard, (Cambridge
University Press, 2004), John Marenbon notes that Abelard was keen on reforming the monastic order to
its former glory: “Abelard became a fervent exponent of monastic reform”(25). I think this is important in
establishing his preoccupation with hypocrisy, at least the perceived hypocrisy of his fellow clerics.
9 Historia Calamitatum, 36.
10 Historia Calamitatum, 36.
8
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detested me; their vile way of life and shameless practices made them hate a man
whose censure they could not endure.”11 Abelard does not seem to be troubled by the
mere fact that they are corrupt, but because they claim to be religious, pious, and are
shamelessly devoid of virtue. He says, “I fell into hands far more savage than pagans’,
and this among Christians and monks.”12 Abelard even seems to think that while most
of their actions were masked in piety, they were really part of a grandiose political
agenda, one that would secure their own power and dominance in the clerical
hierarchy. Furthermore, Abelard perceives this kind of corruption to be widespread and
prevalent among clerics; the corruption he witnesses is not a rare instance but a disease
in the ranks of the church. He resolves that very few of his Christian brothers live
genuine Christian lives.13 They are driven more by their own desires than by a love for
God and his will.
However, the monks of Gildas and Denis are not the only ones who struggle
with pride. There are two stories about impurity of heart in Historia Calamitatum—one
of noticing it in others and noticing it in himself. Abelard sees the calamities that befell

Historia Calamitatum, 28.
Historia Calamitatum, 36.
13 Though Abelard is quick to condemn his fellow monks, he has much more reverence for the
nuns of the Paraclete, Heloise in particular. He says, “And on her, my sister, who had direction of the
nuns, God bestowed upon favor in men’s sight that the bishops loved her as a daughter, abbots as a
sister, the people as a mother, and all liked marveled at her wisdom and dedication, her unmatched
gentleness and patience in all things,” Historia Calamitatum, 39. I suspect Abelard was intentional in his use
of “gentleness” and “patience,” as these are traditionally considered fruits of the Holy Spirit.
11
12
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him as opportunities for humility—means necessary to create a wedge between himself
and those things that kept him from seeking God.
As I was weighed down by my lechery (luxuria) and pride (superbia), the
grace of God brought me relief from both, though not in the ways I would
have it: first from my lechery, by cutting me from the means I used to
practice it, and then from the pride born of my learning—"Knowledge
puffeth up,” the apostle Paul says—by humbling me with the burning of
the book of which I was most proud.14
Abelard could not be any more explicit here. He understands both his lust for
knowledge and for Heloise as impediments to God. Moreover, he interprets his
castration and the condemnation of his theological work as graces, gifts—ones that
would help him let go of these other loves. Yes, the calamities Abelard suffered were,
apparently, because of corrupt, jealous clerics and angry men seeking vengeance.
However, he suffered these miseries because he held on tightly to illicit loves, seeking
his own vain glory.15 This leaves him to caution his reader by saying, “Let the force of
my example curb the ambition of those who seek their own will.”16 Finally he resolves,

Historia Calamitatum, 10. The Latin is “Cum igitur totus in superbia atque luxuria laborarem,
utriusque morbi remedium diuina mihi gratia licet nolenti contulit. Ac primo luxuriae, deinde superbiae;
luxuriae quidem his me priuando quibus hanc exercebam; superbiae uero quae mihi ex litterarum
maxime scientia nascebatur, iuxta illud Apostoli: Scientia inflat. Illius libri quo maxime gloriabar
combustione me humiliando.”
15 Abelard continuously refers to his courtship of Heloise as a game. He claims, “I concluded that
she was the best one to bring to my bed. I was sure it would be easy. I was famous myself at the time,
young, and exceptionally good-looking, and could not imagine that any woman I thought worthy of my
love would turn me down,” (Historia Calamitatum, 11).
16 Historia Calamitatum, 45. The Latin is “Quod nunc quoque ipse de paupere monacho in abbatem
promotus incessanter experior, tanto scilicet miserior quanto ditior effectus; ut nostro etiam exemplo
eorum qui id sponte appetunt ambitio refrenetur.” Levitan separates the thought with a period, while the
Latin critical edition uses a semicolon. As a result the excerpt from the Latin I have included here also
contains the information prior to the semicolon (or before Levitan’s full stop).
14

8

in the final sentence of Historia Calamitatum,“All who are angered, then, by some
physical distress, though they know it was done by God’s plan, leave the path of justice
to be led, not by the will of God, but by their own, and when they set their own will
before God’s they are struggling in their hearts against the words, ‘Thy will be done.” 17
I am pointing out these themes of hypocrisy and impurity of heart in Historia
Calamitatum because they inform the trajectory of Abelard’s academic pursuits. As we
will come to see, intention is a means of addressing and condemning Christian
hypocrisy and the root of a theory that elevates the inner workings of the heart above
exterior, visible action. Knowing that Abelard views his own story through this lens
will help lend veracity to the way I outline his affective understanding of intentionality.
III.

Defining Terms: Philosophical, Religion, Spiritual, Theological
Throughout this dissertation I will be employing several terms that have

dynamic historical meanings and varied colloquial uses, supplied from academic circles
and popular culture. In order to avoid the misunderstanding of the argument I plan to
defend, I want to provide clear indications of how I intend to these words. I am not
suggesting that the following definitions are conceptually correct, objectively accurate,
or even how they ought to be understood. Rather, I am clearly outlining how I will be

Historia Calamitatum, 46. The Latin is:“Ex quo manifeste a iustitia eos recedere demonstrat
quicumque pro aliquo sui grauamine his irascuntur quae erga se diuina dispensatione geri non dubitant,
et se proprie uoluntati magis quam diuinae subiciunt, et ei quod in uerbis sonat: "Fiat uoluntas tua"
desideriis occultis repugnant, diuinae uoluntati propriam anteponentes.”
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using them. As I have noticed throughout this project, failure to define things explicitly
results in some odd interpretations of your work.
An essential aspect of my argument is distancing Abelard’s ethics from the
Kantian interpretation expressed by Peter King. In doing so, I utilize the word
“philosophical” on a repeated basis. Of course, there are over two millennia of debates
surrounding the proper understanding, application, and definition of philosophy. In the
context of this dissertation, I do not wish to enter any of those debates directly. Instead,
when I suggest that Abelard’s Scito te Ipsum is read in strictly philosophical terms,
which has led to a skewed interpretation of the text, I mean the following: a method of
pure reason, which does not rely on scriptural authority, divine revelation, or tradition.
Thus, when it suggested that Abelard does not have purely philosophical interests or
methodology, I am suggesting that it is informed by revelation, scriptural authority,
and tradition. Moreover, I suggest that he is interested in more than making logical
claims; he is putting forth arguments that have spiritual or religious consequences—
they say something about the Christian life, one’s relation to God, and are couched
within a larger redemption narrative. Lastly, evaluating his ethics using a purely
philosophical method—that is, without reference to the religious tradition which
informs it—will lead to bad interpretations of the text. This religious tradition is not
only to be understood by Abelard’s own monastic life, dogmatic commitments, and
devotion, but also the religious training he received, the questions he seeks to answer,
10

and the Patristic influences on his thought. So in many ways my utilization of the word
“philosophical” is the modern, colloquial application. Though I do not which to
perpetuate such a narrow use of the term, it is the most immediately recognizable
without treading into undesirable territory.
In the definition of philosophical I provided above, the words religious and
spiritual were used as well. I do not wish to clearly distinguish these two words in my
own argument. During Abelard’s time to suggest that someone was religious did not
mean that they went to church on Sundays or believed in a deity. Instead, it meant they
took vows to live out a life devoted first and foremost to the Christian God. Typically,
this took the form of vowing poverty, obedience, and chastity and was governed by a
Rule particular to the order of their choosing. Of course, to use the term in this way is
foreign to the modern ear and would confuse the thesis I am trying to defend. Instead,
when I claim Abelard has religious ends, aims, context, method, I claim it is of, or
pertaining to, one’s relation with the divine, a usage akin to the word’s own Latin roots,
religio. This use, of course, includes a large amount of content—praxis, devotions,
prayer, ritual, texts, beliefs, etc.
Now, the word “spiritual” is typically contrasted from religion in modern
popular culture, usually as a pejorative condemnation of the institutional elements of
religious praxis. I do not recognize this pejorative distinction, nor do I employ that
distinction in my own argument. However, insofar as spiritual can be contrasted from
11

religion it would be in the sense that the spiritual conveys the inner life of a given
individual in relation to the divine. This would include spiritual emotions or desires—
those pertaining to divine objects or deities. It is easy to see, according to these
definitions I have briefly sketched, how the spiritual and religious need no sharp
distinction in the context of my argument. For, spiritual exercises—those which prompt
or cultivate spiritual desires or strengthen one’s relation to God—need not be
necessarily individualistic but can, and are supposed to, occur in the context of a
religious community—a community devoted to God. As a result, I will often suggest
that something is “spiritual or religious” so as to not suggest a sharp distinction. At
times I may use only one of these words, but it should not be understood as
intentionally excluding the other.
Theology is, as far as I’m concerned, one of the most difficult terms to define
here. Today, it is often in ordinary language used to relay any study pertaining to the
divine or the study of religion more broadly. As such, sometimes it includes a curious
array of methodologies, or a clear lack of any methodology. However, one can certainly
talk about religion or God without doing theology, so it must be distinguished from
something like the history of religion or sociology of religion. In the Christian tradition,
it would have been described as an inquiry into the divine and man’s relation to it. It
would be described as using scripture, patristic sources (or tradition) and reason as
authorities in answering questions such inquires. Of course, some strands of
12

Christianity may deny the authority or legitimate use of philosophical methods in
religious questions. Others may deny the legitimate use of philosophical methods and
tradition, claiming scripture alone is sufficient in answering any questions about God or
the Christian life. Certainly, if scholars had such convictions and only studied the divine
through utilization of scripture, they would be doing theology. However, I will not be
adopting that sentiment in my use of the word.
Furthermore, it seems theology proper requires some dogmatic convictions—a
belief in the authority of scripture would presuppose the use of scripture as an
authority, for instance. Consequently, though history of religion could be done by
someone lacking some religious or spiritual conviction, it does not seem as though
theology could. So then, I plan to use theology in a way that relays the study of the
divine and man’s relation to it, employing the following authorities: scripture, tradition,
and reason. Though a theological enquiry may not consider all three authorities within
the context of an argument, it will not entirely exclude the legitimate use of all three. In
other words, I do not consider theology to be strictly the study of scripture, or merely
the history of dogmatic or canonical assertions. This is important only because I want to
be clear that when I use “theology” in argumentation it should not be viewed as
something in contrast to reason, as it would potentially include the use of philosophical
methods. This is especially the case for Abelard. So, if it is suggested that Abelard has
theological concerns or that his methodology is theological, it means he is interested in
13

answering questions about the divine—the Triune God specifically and man’s relation
to that—utilizing some combination of these authorities: scripture, tradition, reason. For
Abelard, the proper study of theology includes all three in equal measure.
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CHAPTER ONE:
ABELARD’S GOSPEL OF INTENTION

In Scito te Ipsum, Abelard repeatedly returns to the word “intention, “citing it as
the source of moral praiseworthiness: “It is indeed obvious that works which it is not at
all fitting to do may be performed as much by good as by bad men who are separated
by their intention alone” (Sc. 26:35-27:2). Deciphering the meaning of his suggestion
here may appear to require a simple and straightforward philosophical analysis. We
should consider the manner of speech and the grammatical structure of the sentence.
We should look for patterns in usage and hypothesize possible implications. However,
historians of philosophy know it is much more complicated than that. We know that
Abelard’s vocabulary is centuries apart from our own. This is especially the case for the
word “intention,” which lies at the core of unpacking Abelard’s ethical account. The
way Abelard uses the word is far different than we, as moderns, use it today.
Consequently, the goal of this chapter and the next is to demonstrate that, for Abelard,
intentio is a deeply spiritual and religious term. We cannot grasp Abelard’s ethics, and
the word intentio specifically, without properly situating the text in that religious
context.
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I am so adamant about this contextualization because I fear the recent work on
Abelard’s ethics does not consider the religious context and has mischaracterized the
work as a result. For example, Constant Mews considers Abelard’s interests in the Scito
te ipsum to be somewhat divorced from their theological context, explicitly stating, “His
interest is that of the moral philosopher, not of a spiritual teacher.”18 I will defend
something rather different, namely that Abelard’s ethical concerns are clearly
intertwined with his spiritual ones. Abelard would not appreciate a forced demarcation
between the theological and the philosophical. In fact, it is one he desperately tried to
refuse, even when threatened with excommunication and condemnation. As Abelard
contends, philosophical methodology can be applied to theological questions, which led
to the synthesis of philosophy and theology born among the schoolmen: scholasticism.
My argument to demonstrate this, that intentio carries a slew of spiritual
connotations, will proceed in two steps. First, I will call to mind the Augustinian
tradition that influenced Abelard’s work by considering what William Babcock calls
“Augustine’s spirituality of desire.” This will aid in demonstrating the use of intention
in Augustine’s spirituality. This Augustinian tradition and use of intentio will help us
understand what Abelard has in mind as he uses the word. Second, I will point to
Abelard’s Romans Commentary. Here it will be argued that intention is central in

Mews, Constant J. "Bernard of Clairvaux, Peter Abelard and Heloise on the Definition of
Love." Revista Portuguesa De Filosofia 60, no. 3 (2004): 650.
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distinguishing the Old Covenant from the New. I will divide this explanation into a
series of dichotomies that Abelard posits: The Old and New Covenant, works and
intention, fear and love, and slavery and friendship. Through considering these various
dichotomies I will show how, for Abelard, the New Covenant in Christ enables the
Christian to live out the law with a good intention, that is, out of love for God and not
fear of him. Abelard explains this relationship as a friendship, where the Christian does
not subject himself to God’s command like a slave, but subjects himself to God’s
command as a friend, who graciously sacrifices his own will for the sake of the one he
loves. Thus, Abelard continues utilizing intentio as a theological word—that is, to say
something about the Christian spiritual life. Ultimately, this analysis lays the
foundation for rejecting the Kantian reading of Scito te Ipsum that I challenge in Chapter
3.
I.

Augustine’s Influence
To begin, let us examine the tradition of intentionality preceding Abelard. In

other words, we turn to Augustine. Thankfully, due to the rigorous detail of Sic et Non,
it is relatively easy to establish that Abelard knew his Augustine quite well. Abelard’s
collection of sentences is impressively vast, including hundreds of lengthy quotations
from over two dozen of Augustine’s works. However, Abelard was not merely well
read. Augustine was, perhaps, the biggest influence on his thought. Understanding the
importance of traditional authority, Abelard grounds most of his innovative projects in
17

the Augustinian tradition, from his work on the Trinity to his ethics. 19 All of this is to
say that it can be safely assumed that Abelard is working with a view of intention that is
embedded in the Augustinian corpus. It will become clear in the second half of this
chapter that Abelard utilizes this view of intention and gives it a special role in his
reading of the Gospel.20 So then, in what follows I will briefly outline intentionality per
Augustine, focusing specifically on the Confessions in which the concept of intentionality
is most prominent. In doing so three things about intention will be demonstrated: 1)
intention connotes a focus or orientation of the will; 2) this orientation of the will is
inclined by one’s strongest or weightiest love; 3) one cannot choose what one’s
intentions are. As Abelard utilizes the word intentio in his own theology, the term
maintains these key features.
Due to the fact that Augustine’s corpus refuses any systematic treatment it is
surely difficult to ascribe any doctrine of intentionality to him. Despite this fact, Andrea
Nightingale, drawing on the work of Caston and O’Daly, has pieced together a

Stephen Cartwright acknowledges this is his introduction to Abelard’s Commentary on
Romans (The Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 26: “Augustine thus holds a certain weight
with Abelard.” There are many other acknowledgements of this fact as well.
20 Constant Mews argues in “Bernard of Clairvaux, Peter Abelard and Heloise on the Definition
of Love" 649, that “Quite unprecedented in patristic tradition is his claim that caritas is amor honestus,
pure love, directed toward its legitimate end, namely God. Everything we do, whether eating, sleeping or
taking a wife, has to be done for his sake; otherwise we live like animals. This definition of caritas as pure
love is without precedent in patristic tradition. Abelard replaces Augustine's theological definition of
caritas as a movement of the spirit to enjoyment God for his own sake, with one that emphasizes the
purity of intention of true love, which seeks no reward such as the enjoyment of eternal life.” In contrast
to Mews, I am arguing that this view of intentionality is only different semantically than Augustine’s
account of charity. Thus, it definitely has precedent in the Patristic literature: Augustine’s ordo amorum.
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surprisingly coherent account of intention’s role in the Augustinian spirituality.21
Nightingale describes intentio as a “specific activity of the will,” which “connects the
soul to specific objects and keeps it focused on one thing or another.”22 In other words
the intention of the will brings various objects or ends into focus in action or thought,
either consciously or unconsciously. John Rist is in agreement, noting that Augustine’s
favorite word to indicate direction or concentration of the will is intentio.23 Nightingale
continues to explain that this focus, directionality, or attention given to various objects
correlates with and is informed by those objects which are deemed valuable.
Furthermore, as far as Augustine is concerned, we are more attentive to those things we
value more and we naturally work towards ends we desire. Thus, intention can be
described as the orienting of our will towards our greatest love, an attentiveness or
focus on that which is desired most.
So one’s greatest love or strongest desire will serve as the orienting force of the
will and one’s purpose for acting, doing, etc. We see this sentiment playing out in Conf.
11.29.39:
Yet because your mercy is better than lives, (Ps. 62:4) behold, my life is a
distention, and your right hand has lifted me up in my Lord, the Son of
Man, the Mediator (1 Tim. 2:5) between you, who are one, and us, who are
Nightingale, Andrea. "Augustine on Extending Oneself to God through Intention." Augustinian
Studies no. 2 (2015): 185-209. See also: G. O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1987) and V. Caston, “Connecting Traditions: Augustine and the Greeks on
Intentionality,” in Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality, ed. D. Perler (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2001).
22 Nightingale,“Extending oneself to God through intention,” 187-88.
23 Rist, John. Augustine, Ancient Thought Baptized. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996),
108.
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many—with many distractions about many things—so that through him I
might grasp the one who also has me in his grasp, and from the fragments
of days past be gathered up to follow the One, forgetting those things that
are past, and not stretched out through distention but straining forward in
intention to the things that lie ahead (not to future things that are but
fleeting), I press on toward the prize of the upward call, (Phil. 3:12–14)
where I will hear the voice of praise (Ps. 25:7) and gaze upon your delight,
(Ps. 26:4) which neither comes to be nor passes away.
Here, the intentionality of the search rests in its looking or stretching forward to what
lies ahead--a very particular desired end: union with God. This is contrasted specifically
with distraction or distention, a multiplicity of loves (often associated with inordinate
desires) that lead one down rogue paths—a scattering of sorts that results in a restless,
unsettled heart. So we can gather from this example that intentionality directly
correlates with the strength and unity of the heart’s desire and keeps an agent focused
on a particular end by virtue of this strength and unity of desire. In order for this to be
accomplished, one must “forget that which is behind” or surrender her other loves.
Hannah Arendt describes this mode as being “‘extended’ (extentus) toward what lies
ahead (ante) and is ‘not yet’ (nondum).”24 She further claims that in such a mode, “man
forgets and disdains his own worldly past along with the world's multiplicity from
which he recollected himself.”25 Thus, Arendt re-emphasizes this sentiment: that one

Arendt, Love and Augustine, eds. Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott & Judith Chelius Stark, (University of
Chicago Press, 1998), 29.
25 Ibid
24
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acts intently by having a focused desire, which requires a forgetting or a letting go of
other objects of desire.
Though Augustine is not consistent in his terminology, he does use two
metaphors in particular to describe this phenomenon in Confessions: weight and glue.
One example of this glue metaphor is found in 4.10.15:
For all these things let my soul praise you, O God (Ps. 145:2), Creator of all
things,63 but let it not be fixed upon them by the glue of love through the
senses of the body. For they go where they will go, so that they exist no more,
and they tear the soul apart through its unhealthy desires; for the soul wants
to exist, and it loves to rest in the things it loves. But there is no place to rest
in them, for they do not stay put: and who can chase after them through the
sense of the body?
Our love is like glue, keeping us fixated upon those things we desire the most. Created
things are by no means bad in themselves; however, they are bad insofar as they
become sought and desired for the sake of themselves, as if they never will cease to be.
Desiring or loving them as such glues us to them indefinitely though they pass away
definitively. The gaze of the mind’s eye does not extend beyond the temporal object of
desire. And so, one is stuck, fixed on something subordinate to God and thus loving
inordinately. This imagery of glue does an excellent job in demonstrating what this
fixation or focus on temporal objects prevents one from doing: making the upward
ascent towards God, completely, finally, and totally. Augustine continues to explain
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that these loves must pass away, must move out of focus “so that others might take
their place” (Conf. 4.11.16).26
The metaphor of weight, though brought up on multiple occasions, most
famously appears in Book 13.8.9: “My weight is my love. Wherever I am carried, my
love is carrying me.” The heaviest weight--the strongest love--orients and directs the
will. It will determine where one is carried, the path one journeys. Although one may
desire union with God most, in this earthly life the soul struggles against itself, unable
to completely rid itself of temporal desires competing for God’s affection.
Coincidentally, shortly after this, Augustine remarks that when, finally, we arrive at the
house of the Lord, “there we will be brought to our place by a good will, so that we
want nothing but to stay there forever” (Conf. 13.8.9). Notice that, again, one can ascend
up to God only through a pure or simple intention, wanting and desiring only to be in
God’s presence. In such a state one forgets all else that he wants and sees only what lies
ahead, for we cannot focus on more than one thing at a time. The gaze is fixed in its
proper place and the heart can finally rest. It is no surprise that Augustine uses fire to
describe this ascent as the desire for God is so abundant and all-consuming that nothing
else remains. This, of course, is ideal. However, it should be re-emphasized that it is not

26Augustine

returns to the metaphor again in Book 10, commiserating his former sins which
remain fixed within the depths of his memory and continue to manifest in his dreams. He says, “Lord,
you will increase your gifts in me more and more, rescuing my soul from the honey-trap of
concupiscence so that it will follow me to you…” (Conf. 10.30.42).
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possible to maintain such a unity of desire during one’s earthly life. We are very easily
distracted. Empty stomachs, pretty people, and lizards scurrying across the floor during
prayer are real worries. We can surely be more or less focused, though.
William Babcock describes what I have just outlined above as Augustine’s
“spirituality of desire.”27 In elucidating Augustine’s concept of the divided will,
Babcock rightly stresses the importance of delight:
When Augustine speaks of denying consent to the desires of the flesh, his
language should not evoke dark images of the grim heroism of a self,
refusing all delight or resisting all desire. Rather Augustine means us to
recognize that the religious life and the struggle it entails, is rooted in a prior
and more dominant desire for and delight in God. Not an absence of delight
but the presence of a stronger delight it what motivates the will to refuse
consent to the desires of the flesh and to hold out against their allure.28
Babcock’s point is especially astute. He demonstrates that this notion of a divided will
illuminates what, exactly, a love for God is able to do. It does not simply negate all preexisting desires. It does not completely extinguish the concupiscence of the flesh.
However, if God is one’s greatest love then that love will serve as the orienting force of
the will. It will, as Augustine contends, move you. Without a doubt, this is why
Augustine places so much emphasis on the ordo amorum. If God is desired above all else,
then your actions will correspond to this desire. This is perhaps why it is so difficult to

27

Babcock, William. “Augustine and the Spirituality of Desire.” Augustinian Studies no. 25 (1995):

28

Ibid

179-199.

23

distinguish between “will” and “love” in the Augustinian corpus. They are virtually the
same because love guides the will with very a forceful hand.29
I think it necessary to further reflect on this notion of a “stronger delight” in
order to understand its power. The most immediate and common example is a romantic
relationship—one that is particularly fresh and new. A romantic interest, particularly if
it is a strong interest, grabs our attention in a remarkable way. If this person bids to
spend time with us, almost everything else becomes peripheral. Is there a paper that
needs writing? Is there laundry that needs to be done? It can wait. There is something
more pressing and important: your beloved. Everything else in view becomes
secondary while under the sway of love’s myopic vision. It is not that you no longer
care about your academic work. It is not that you no longer have a desire for clean
clothes. It is just that the stronger desire beats all these others out; it changes your
priorities. As a result, one will most likely take actions to ensure that one’s primary or
strongest desire is fulfilled. As Babcock rightly points out, Augustine’s continence is not
born of duty, of knowledge of what is good, of a desire to want to be good even.
Instead, it is made possible through love for God, a present desire for Him. This is
precisely why continence comes so late:
Late have I loved you, beauty so ancient and so new! Late have I loved you!
And behold, you were within, but I was outside and looked for you there,
Sara Byers has an excellent article on this titled, “The Meaning of Voluntas in Augustine,”
Augustinian Studies 37.2 (2006), 171-189.
29
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and in my ugliness I seized upon these beautiful things that you have made.
You were with me, but I was not with you. Those things held me far away
from you— things that would not even exist if they were not in you. You
called, you shouted, and you broke through my deafness; you flashed, you
shone, and you dispersed my blindness; you breathed perfume, and I drew
in my breath and pant for you; I tasted, (Ps. 33:9, 1 Pet. 2:3) and I hunger
and thirst; (Mt. 5:6, 1 Cor. 4:11) you touched me, and I was set on fire for
your peace. (Ps. 4:9) (Conf. 10.27.38)
This is what put off Augustine’s own conversion for so long—he loved God but he
really loved sex too, maybe just as much. As a result there was no dominant desire in
his heart; Augustine was struggling for continence within a state of true ambivalence.
Harry Frankfurt explains the nature of ambivalence quite well and the effect it
has on the will, even tying it back to Augustine’s Confessions specifically. He notes, “To
the extent that a person is ambivalent, he does not really know what he wants. [...] He is
volitionally inchoate and indeterminate.”30 As a result, Frankfurt stresses that
identifying any particular affective or motivational identity of such an ambivalent agent
is moot. Thus, when a dominant desire does emerge, when ambivalence is shattered,
an affective or motivational identity can be identified in the agent. This grants focus to
the will and an intention is born.
So far, the first two points I planned on demonstrating have been proven. First, it
is clear from what I have shown that for Augustine, intention is a focus or orientation of
the will. Moreover, this focus or orientation is inclined by love or desire. In other words,
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one’s weightiest love motivates and influences the will’s focus. Therefore, Augustine is
not simply being cheeky in his sermon on 1 John 4:4-12, where he says, “Love and do
what you will.”31 He absolutely means it. Now, before turning to Abelard’s reading of
Romans and his understanding of the Gospel, let us briefly turn to my third and final
point on Augustine: desires, and so intention, cannot be chosen.
As we see playing out through Augustine’s journey towards conversion, no
specific bit of theological information affords him the ability to make the decisive turn
towards Christ. Knowledge of Christian doctrine does not make one a Christian. I
suspect there would be more Christians in Religious Studies departments if this were
the case. Moreover, Augustine is unable to simply decide to convert. This is
unquestionably why Augustine gives grace such a large, and annoyingly operative, role
in the Christian life. Our affections seem largely out of our control. Again, Frankfurt is
helpful in understanding this point:

Since ambivalence is not a cognitive deficiency, it cannot be overcome
merely by acquiring additional information. It also cannot be overcome
voluntaristically. A person cannot make himself volitionally determinate
and thereby create a truth where there was none before, merely by an “act
of will.” In other words, he cannot make himself wholehearted just by a
physical movement that is fully under his immediate voluntary control.32
Augustine, Homilies on the First Epistle of John, trans. Boniface Ramsey, (New City Press, 2008),
Sermon 7.8: “This is what I insist upon: human actions can only be understood by their root in love. All
kinds of actions might appear good without proceeding from the root of love. Remember, thorns also
have flowers: some actions seem truly savage, but are done for the sake of discipline motivated by love.
Once and for all, I give you this one short command: love, and do what you will.”
32 Frankfurt, “The Faintest Passion,” 100.
31
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Frankfurt explains the problem of ambivalence quite well. For our purposes, the
relevant aspect of his point is that we cannot choose what we really want. We cannot
decide our motivational identity. And while Frankfurt doesn’t speak here in terms of
intention specifically, G.E.M. Anscombe does, claiming, “The idea that one can
determine one’s intentions by making a speech to oneself is obvious bosh.”33 Frankfurt
and Anscombe both seem to be pointing towards the same fundamental assumption:
we cannot, by sheer volitional force, decide what we want. We can form and shape
desires, but this takes a bit of practice. Eventually a second-order desire (wanting to
want), might emerge as a dominant desire and orient the will if we make efforts to
shape it. However, there is no guarantee.34 Yet Augustine maintains this crucial point:
what we love determines everything.35
To complete this examination of Augustine’s “spirituality of desire” it is
important to recall, again, that he has no doctrine of intentionality. There is no
systematic Augustinian treatment of intentionality in the Augustinian corpus. When the
word intentio appears, it corresponds to notions of focus, orientation of the will, and
desire. As such, I suggest we can conclude the following about Augustine’s treatment of
intentionality: 1) intention connotes a focus or orientation of the will; 2) this orientation

Anscombe, G.E.M, Intention, 2nd ed. (Harvard University Press, 2000), 42, §25.
For more on Frankfurt and the notion of second order desires see: Frankfurt, Harry G.
"Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person." The Journal of Philosophy 68, no. 1 (1971): 5-20.
35 I realized this wording “love determines everything” was something I first encountered in a
prayer written by Fr. Pedro Arrupe, S.J. I wanted to make sure I gave him credit. It can be found in,
Finding God in All Things: A Marquette Prayer Book. (Marquette University Press, 2009).
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of the will is inclined by one’s strongest, or weightiest love; 3) one cannot choose one’s
intentions. This notion of intention, and all the Augustinian implications it bears,
becomes the lens through which Abelard reads and understands the Gospel. It is to this
that we now turn.
II.

Old Covenant versus the New: Works versus Intention
In this section I will be focusing on Abelard’s Commentary on St. Paul’s letter to

the Romans; some general context of that letter is in order. The obvious theme in
Romans is justification—what makes one right with God. The Gentile Christians in
Rome are living among many Jewish Christians, who are insisting that all “followers of
the Way” must keep the Mosaic Law. Part of keeping this law, and perhaps the most
fundamental aspect of it, is the mark of circumcision—this is what separates God’s
chosen people from the Gentiles. As a result, a theological controversy erupts among
the Christians in Rome, between the Gentiles and the Jews, about what puts one in right
relation with God. Is it the Mosaic Law? If so, is circumcision necessary for the Gentile
Christians? Paul’s letter to the Romans was written to specifically address this question.
In it, Paul attempts to demonstrate the significance of the New Covenant in Christ.
Here, we will get Abelard’s interpretation of Paul’s explanation. He delivers an answer
that will not be immediately familiar to most Christians: intention.
Throughout Abelard’s exegesis of Romans four main dichotomies occur
repeatedly: The Old Covenant versus the New, works versus intention, fear versus love,
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and slavery versus friendship. As you might notice, each of these dichotomies are
familiar and appear explicitly in Scripture, with one exception: works versus intention.
A version of this becomes focal in most Reformed theologies: works versus faith. The
emphasis in such theologies is belief; one must explicitly accept Jesus Christ as Lord
and Savior in order to be saved. As a result, these traditions place emphasis on the
acceptance of certain doctrinal propositions that are taken to be fundamental. The
emphasis for Abelard is on something quite different. Obviously, it is intention. The
intention Abelard is preoccupied is one’s intention in acting. Thus, propositional belief
is not primary, but the affection or love that serves as the motivational force of a
particular actions. Ultimately, love of God is synonymous with a good intention. This
love is sufficient for salvation.
This centrality of intention in the Gospel message is immediately clear from the
very outset of Abelard’s exegesis of Romans. It makes its first appearance in the
exegesis of 1:16:
THE GOSPEL, that is, the good news, is called the New Testament on
account of its excellence, not only, as we explained above, because it teaches
that what was promised in the Old Testament was fulfilled, but also
because its teaching of righteousness is entirely and truly sufficient and
perfect, since the old law, as the Apostle himself says, brought nothing to
perfection, correcting works rather than intention (Comm Rom I.1.16, 111).36
All translations from Abelard’s Romans Commentary are from Stephen Cartwright, (The Catholic
University of America Press, 2012). When necessary, I will supply the Latin from E.M. Buytaert, CCCM
11(Turnout, 1969). In addition, it is important to note that Abelard’s commentary consists of various
quotes from Scripture and a subsequent explanation. He takes each passage phrase by phrase. I will
indicate which parts of the passage are quotations from the Vulgate by putting them in bold and
capitalizing them. This is my emphasis and not Cartwright’s.
36
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In this passage it is easy to tell that the distinguishing feature of the New Covenant is its
emphasis on intention. This is what separates it from the Old Covenant, which by
Abelard’s lights had a scrupulous preoccupation with works or deeds. The implication
is simple: The Mosaic Law was concerned primarily with works—that certain works
were carried out and that certain laws were kept. The New Covenant is still concerned
with this. It did not simply forgo an interest in human action. Rather, it brings this
concern to perfection, by focusing on how these actions are performed. In order to
discern how human actions are performed we cannot consider them apart from their
actor. Essentially, what is their intention in acting? What do they desire? What do they
love? Abelard makes this same point again in considering the very next verse, Romans
1:17.
For it follows, as if from contraries, that, while we know the things which
deserve punishment with God, we understand also the things which gain
reward, because it is necessary that he who hates evil love good, just as it is
written: “You have loved righteousness and hated iniquity.” But I think this
is especially revealed and distinguished in the Gospel where the Lord
considers all the things which happen according to the root of intention,
saying: “If your eye is single (simplex), your entire body will be full of light.
If your eye is dark, your whole body will be dark.” And this indeed is the
weighing of true righteousness, where all the things which happen are
examined according to the intention rather than according to the quality of
the works. The Jews paid more attention to these works than to the
intention, although now Christians, with natural righteousness awakened,
pay attention not so much to the things that happen as to the inclination
(animo) with which they may be done (Comm Rom. I.1.17, pgs. 111-2).
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The same general idea present in the previous passage is also explicit here: The New
Covenant is rightly focused on intention, which tells us something about the quality of
the work or deed being done. However, Abelard cross-references Matthew 6:22-23 here,
which reveals more about what he believes intention to be. So, though I do not wish to
embark on a detailed exegesis of Matthew 6 here, some explanation is helpful.
This bit of scripture is part of Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount. Just before this
particular verse, Jesus provides an extensive exhortation on how one ought to act. He
warns of doing pious acts in order to be seen. He warns of praying in a routine,
innocuous way. At the very end of this exhortation, and right before Matthew 6:22-23,
comes the verse: “Where your treasure is there your heart will be also,” implying that
one loves what is valued most. Putting all of this together, it is clear that, for Abelard,
intentions in actions are inclined by what one loves. Do you love being viewed as
pious? If so, that is why you do pious deeds. To pretend as though you do pious deeds
for God when you really desire human praise more is delusion or lack of selfknowledge. We discern our intentions by evaluating what we want from our actions;
what we want is determined by what we desire or love. Thus, the process of ensuring
good intention is first being aware of what we desire and then simplifying what we
desire.
Abelard explores this process of simplifying desires more deeply in the Quaestio
in Book III, following his exegesis of Romans 7:6:
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Truth says through himself (semetipsam), “You have heard that it was said
to the ancients,” etc., and, “Unless your righteousness abounds,” etc., its
reward could not be perfect; neither were heavenly things suitable for
earthly desires (desideriis), nor can someone be fit for God who serves as
much for earthly things as for heavenly ones. Therefore, the Truth warns
through himself (semetipsam), saying, “Let not your left hand know what
your right hand is doing”; that is, do not mix an earthly intention with a
heavenly one in any work of yours, so that you obey God for transitory and
eternal goods at the same time. (Comm Rom. III.7.4. 243)
Here the Augustinian association between intention and focus and between unity and
desire comes to the fore. The motivational identity of the agent is most difficult to discern
when there is no clear, dominant desire. If one’s desire for recognition and praise is on
par with one’s desire for God, the mind’s eye is muddied, unclear, out of focus; it cannot
see clearly. The result? We don’t know why we are doing what we are doing. Like
pouring salt into water, once the two—and earthly and heavenly desire—are mixed they
are near impossible to separate. So then, intentions are good insofar as they are simple,
single, or pure. “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God” (Mt. 5:8). Again,
the point Abelard tries to make is the same: actions alone have no value. They gain merit
only through reference to the actor’s intention.
Hopefully by now it is apparent that intention is the interpretive lens through
which Abelard reads and understands the Gospel. Though The New Covenant in
Christ is not an abolishment of the Law; it does not dismiss the importance of
obedience. Instead, it is a fulfillment or perfection of the Law—it requires that good
works be done well, that is, with a good intention. Thus, when Abelard speaks of
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intentio he means the affective motive with which an agent acts—in other words, what
one wants in acting. In the section to follow, this will become increasingly clear as I look
specifically at love, fear, and their respective intentional objects.
III.

Fear versus Love: Slavery versus Friendship
Examining the difference between fear and love as affective motivators will

elucidate Abelard’s emphasis on good intention.37 To begin, I will first turn to the
Collationes. In the first collatio Abelard depicts an ethical debate between a Jew and a
Philosopher. The Philosopher is interested in hearing out the Jew’s justification for
following the Mosaic Law and why it is necessary. The Jew’s defense sheds light on how
Abelard understands Jewish theology and moral psychology. Moreover, it explains
Abelard’s scorn for a sheer ethic of obedience. The Jew begins with this rationale:
JEW: “If, as we believe, the law which we follow was given to us by God,
we should not be blamed for adhering to it but rather rewarded for our
obedience—and those who scorn it are most seriously mistaken. It may be
that I cannot compel you to accept that it was given by God, yet you are not
able to refute this. But let me take an example from an ordinary run of
human life and you, I beg, tell me what advice you would give. I am the
servant of a lord whom I greatly fear to offend, and I have many other
fellow servants who share this fear. They tell me that, when I was away, our
lord gave a certain command to all his servants, of which I know nothing
but which they are performing and which they urge me to perform along
This same critique was made internally within Judaism by the philosopher Bahya Ibn Paquda.
Tamar Rudavsky makes this point in his article “Ethics in Medieval Jewish Philosophy” in the Cambridge
Companion to Medieval Ethics, ed. Thomas Williams, (Cambridge University Press, 2018). He says, “Bahya
characterizes the ‘inner duties of the heart’ as connected to inward intentionality and expresses surprise
that nobody has written about these duties, which he finds to be ‘the basis of all the commandments! If
they were to be undermined, there would be no point to any of the duties of the limbs!’ The ultimate
purpose of these inner duties is to serve God. The ideal state, which Bahya terms ‘wholeheartedness,’ is
reached when human beings attain complete accord of mind and body” ( 105).
37
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with them. What course of action do you commend to me, if I have doubts
about this command, at which I was not present?” (Coll. 13, 15).
He continues:
JEW: “Indeed, it is pious and entirely fitting with reason and in accord with
both God’s goodness and the salvation of humankind, to consider that God
takes such care of humans that he sees fit to teach them by means of a
written law and to restrain our wickedness at least by fear of punishment”
(Coll. 14, 17).
First, it is obvious that Abelard’s Jew cites fear as the primary motivator for following the
law. Second, according to the Jew, God seems strikingly similar to Hobbes’s Leviathan—
he is an absolute sovereign who retrains human wickedness through fear of punishment.
This explanation fits squarely with Abelard’s New Covenant theology; the New
Covenant brings the Old to perfection because it is not only focused on human action,
but the intention with which actions are performed. Obedience qua obedience is not
praiseworthy. In fact, obedience with malintent may be damning.
Moreover, Abelard’s Jew considers this obedience—one born of fear—as evidence
of his love for God. He says, “I perhaps love (diligo) him as much as you do and, in
addition, I show this by performing religious duties (opera), which you do not have” (Coll.
14, 19). Abelard’s Jew makes an interesting claim here: love for God can be demonstrated
through the performance of religious duties. That is, one can give a description of love
for God by appealing simply to the actions one performs. Abelard could not disagree
more. He insists that we cannot give a description of love for God by merely appealing
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to one’s actions. It is entirely possible that someone chooses to perform seemingly good
acts for evil or selfish ends.
Let us consider an example to demonstrate Abelard’s concern. Joe is a very
obedient child. He completes his homework on time, helps with the dishes, keeps his
room clean, and never talks back to his mother. Without considering Joe’s intentions, we
may be quick to call Joe a “good boy.” He does just what his mother asks of him!
However, what if we discovered that Joe is moved to behave simply because he fears his
mother? She is ill-tempered and has a tendency to ridicule Joe when he misbehaves or
makes a mistake. According to Abelard, we may not call Joe a sinner, but he certainly is
not deserving of praise. More importantly, we would not be able to say that Joe is
obedient because he loves his mother. We can understand what Joe really loves by
considering the intentional object of fear. When Joe chooses to obey because he is afraid,
Joe is concerned with his own self-preservation. He obeys because he does not want to be
ridiculed by his mother. As it turns out, Joe really cares about himself. Thus, obedience
born of fear is merely self-interest; the intentional object is reflexive. Just as Abelard
explains “It should not even be called ‘charity’ if we love him for our own sakes, that is,
for our own advantage and for the happiness of his kingdom which we look for from
him, rather than for his own sake, establishing the end of our own intention in ourselves,
and not in him” (Comm Rom. III. Question 4, 255). Therefore, love of God, by definition,
must have God as the intentional object.
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Truly, Abelard takes radical view of what is necessary for love, and thereby good
intention. It must not contain a trace of self-interest; the intentional object must always
be God. Abelard’s exegesis of Romans 3:12, he makes this especially evident:
THERE IS NOT EVEN ONE. It is a repetition of what was said before,
namely, of that which was said: there is none who does good, so that the
qualifier might be supplied lest the saying be taken generally. Therefore, it
is as if he should say, there is no one, I say, who does good until he comes
by believing and by joining himself through love to him who truly is one
and unchangeable by nature and unique through eminence, that is, to God
or to Christ, who is “the one mediator between God and man” through faith
in whom he argues in what follows that we are saved without the works of
the law. It can even be understood in this way: there is none who does good,
even one, as if he should say: there is scarcely anyone who does good; that
is, there is almost no one who does good. For there is almost no one where
one only remains. (Comm Rom. I.3.12, 154)38
This passage exemplifies both the spiritual dimension of Abelard’s intentionalism and
the exclusivity that results from it. Love of God is not love of some abstract principle or
free-floating Platonic form. Love has a specific intentional object and he is personal: Jesus
Christ. In and through love of God one becomes joined to him. Though works come in
and out of existence—they occupy a short and specific temporal space—love of God joins
one to the infinite life of the Trinity. “For only charity, which never passes away, merits

The Latin is: NON EST USQUE AD UNUM. Repetitio est praemissi, illius uidelicet quod
dictum est non est qui faciat bonum, ut determinatio subderetur ne generaliter dictum putaretur. Tale est
itaque ac si diceret: non est, inquam, qui faciat bonum usquequo ueniat credendo et per amorem se
copulando ei qui uere unus est et immutabilis per naturam et singularis per eminentiam, id est Deo siue
Christo, qui est unos Dei et hominum mediator, per cuius fidem in sequentibus saluari nos adstruet sine
operibus legis. Potest etiam ita intelligi non est qui faciat bonum usque ad unum, ac si diceretur: uix est
qui faciat bonum, id est fere nullus est qui faciat. Fere enim nullus est ubi unus tantum superest.
38
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eternal life; and those who are equal in charity are held as equals before God in reward”
(Comm Rom. III.8.18, 275).
This notion of salvation by charity further pushes Abelard’s deemphasis on works.
Merit is not tallied up according to the number of things accomplished by the faithful. If
Simon fed the hungry more frequently than Matthew, Simon’s salvation is not de facto
more secure. Simon may have had more opportunity to be charitable and thus
accomplished these works more frequently. Simon may be more able-bodied, wealthy, or
endowed with more free time. These circumstantial privileges should not hold any
weight on the scale of salvation. Charity is not measured quantitatively, but qualitatively.
God does not judge with one, long collective list of all their pious acts; He weighs the
heart.
Though Abelard rejects the saving quality of works, he doesn’t claim that they are
all together unimportant. This would be to gravely misunderstand Abelard’s theological
position. Instead, Abelard believes that works are only given substance through their
love—the intention with which they are performed. Works performed without love are
but straw, they merit nothing. However, Abelard believes that the performance of good
deeds, those motivated by charity, are essential for the life of the Church and the
evangelization of souls. Through good works of the faithful, one perceives the charity
that is hidden in their hearts—God’s love becomes incarnate and made known to others,
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inspiring them to seek the source. Abelard explains this in his Sermon on Almsgiving,
written for the Paraclete:
Now, the receding north wind departs and the south wind comes when the
formerly cold hearts of men are enkindled by the fire of charity. The
blowing south wind is felt (sentitur) and charity is demonstrated by the
giving of alms. The south wind may be there in the soul, but it is not yet
blowing full force; charity is held in the soul, but not yet manifest in the
work. However, for it to blow, be raised up, and perceived, it must be
manifest in the work one does for the needs of one’s neighbor. Then the
fragrance that was first in the soul hidden away, flows, in such a way that
the love of God, just as much as love of neighbor, is exhibited by the
performance of visible works. Then the flowing fragrance extends its smell
in a similar way when the overflowing perfume of charity is made known
to many and they are drawn to the imitation of others’ good deeds.39
Abelard explains that charity can only be seen is through our actions, since only God can
see into the hidden parts of one’s soul. In other words, simply because someone does
something that appears charitable does not mean they actually possess charity in their
heart. However, charity can only be seen and perceived through our actions; genuinely
charitable actions make it possible for charity to be perceived.
Now we are in a position to consider the effects of such love, bringing this
discussion to the final dichotomy Abelard uses to distinguish the Old Covenant from the
New: slavery and friendship. In order to understand the theological distinction between
slavery and friendship we should keep in mind both fear and love as Abelard

This translation is my own. I utilized the Latin from Petrus Abaelardus Opera, vol. I. eds. Victor
Cousin, C. Jourdain & E. Despois. (Paris, 1849), reprint Georg Olms Verlag, 1970.
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understands them. To review, the kind of love articulated above is both affective in nature
and must correspond to a particular, and personal, intentional object. Abelard seems to
believe that fear, not love, was the primary motivation for obedience to the Mosaic Law—
under the dominion of such fear man takes on a slavish posture. Fearful obedience to the
law establishes servant/Master relation between man and God. Slaves have no
expectation of inheritance from the Master’s kingdom or share in the profit of the estate.
They simply work for the sake of maintaining their existence and follow the law to avoid
the consequence of punishment and secure his own livelihood. However, this is but one
way to serve God. Abelard believes that love offers another way—the willing service of
friendship.
TO THE BELOVED OF GOD, as if he should say: I do not say simply to
all who are at Rome, to believers and to unbelievers, to the elect and to the
reprobate, but to these only who through their conversion have now
entered into friendship with God, now made subject to him in the manner
of the Christians, that is, by love rather than by fear (Comm Rom. I.1.7, 105).
Such an affection for God prompts a willing sacrifice of self and one’s corresponding
carnal desires. Love prompts obedience instead of fear; the love moving the will shifts
from a selfish love to a selfless love, resulting in different intentional objects.
Furthermore, such a friendship is free from the struggle that plagues the
Master/servant relation. Abelard indicates this in his exegesis of Romans 2:13: “the
doers are those who by the love of God act spontaneously (sponte), according to which a
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good will is accounted as a work done” (Comm Rom. I.2.13, 133).40 Friendship, because it
is established in affection for the other, possesses an inherent freedom. The word
“spontaneously” indicates this, as it suggests that the will is not forced or struggling to
move in a particular direction. This is particularly what love, genuine affection, has the
capacity to do: remove struggle. For example, I may be focused on writing my
dissertation, making substantial progress on completing this work I want to finish.
However, if a friend calls seeking support after a difficult day, I would graciously
sacrifice my productive afternoon to take the call. I want to listen to her; I want to
alleviate her hurt. So, even though I have my own selfish desires, the love for my friend
trumps them; it frees me from the prioritization of myself. The greater our love for the
other the easier self-sacrifice becomes. Ultimately, service born of affection is different
in kind from service or obedience born of fear—one frees, the other shackles.
IV.

Conclusions
Ultimately, Abelard’s New Covenant theology is explicitly focused on the inner

man—this distinguishes the Sermon on the Mount and the Mosaic Law. The New
Covenant perfects human action by addressing the intention with which actions are
performed and not simply that actions are performed. Moreover, according to Abelard

Abelard also uses spontaneous to describe acts of charity in Sc. 72:6-10: “Otherwise they who
bore the heavy yoke of the Law would be of greater merit before the Lord than they who serve with
evangelical freedom because fear, which perfect charity casts out, has pain and they toil more in their
work when all things are done in fear than those whom charity makes spontaneous (spontaneos).” The
sense is that Abelard suggests that spontaneous actions are actions done without force, struggle, or
coercion.
40
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intentions are good insofar as they are born of love. He prescribes a qualification for this
purifying love: it must be selfless, meaning that it must have God as the intentional
object. In effect, this changes the nature of relation between God and man. In love the
dominion of sin is dethroned; love moves and motivates the will to transcend the self,
moving towards the other.
This reading of the Gospel has much in common with the “spirituality of desire”
that Babcock identifies in Augustine’s Confessions. Let us carefully review the
similarities: First, throughout the Romans Commentary a description of intentionality
emerges that is unquestionably affective—what one loves or desires determines the
orientation and motivation of the will. Second, the only proper intentional object of the
will is God. In Augustine’s language: only God is to be enjoyed. This point is, perhaps,
the most characteristic feature of Augustinian ethics and Abelard endorses it. Lastly,
Abelard gives no indication that desires, or loves, which orient and motivate the will
can be determined by consent or volitional force. On the contrary, discussions of
intention always correlate with desire. My point in addressing these similarities
between Augustine’s spiritualty and Abelard’s theology is to show that any ethical
claims Abelard makes regarding intention are clearly situated within this spiritual
context. The spiritual grounds the ethical. Intentio, for Abelard, is not an intellectual
determination, declaration, or establishment of ends. Instead, intention is determined
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by what the heart wants. This will become especially important when considering the
distinction between intentio and consensus in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO:
DISTINGUISHING INTENTION AND CONSENT

It should be clear from the previous chapter that Abelard’s understanding of the
Gospel is heavily predicated upon a certain use and application of the word intention—
it is informed by Augustinian spirituality and has clear affective connotations. In effect,
when Abelard expresses that actions ought to be evaluated by looking at their root, or
intention, he is concerned with what one wants or desires in their actions. This is very
explicitly the case in the Romans Commentary and can be easily demonstrated through
careful exegesis of Scito te Ipsum. Thus, it is curious that many have read Abelard as
dismissing the role of the passions in assessment of moral praise, making his ethics
rather Kantian as a byproduct.
The present chapter will diagnosis the source of this curious reading: the
conflation of intention and consent. Distinguishing these formerly conflated concepts
yields a new reading of Abelard’s ethics, specifically his account of moral praise. For
Abelard, moral praise is almost interchangeable with salvific merit. One is praiseworthy
before God if and only if she poses charity. In other words, one acts well when one acts
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charitably. This presupposes that one acts rightly, which is to do what the natural law
demands.
I will proceed in three parts. First, I will review the existence of this explicit
conflation of terms in the secondary literature. Second, I will provide an interpretation
of consent and intention as they appear in Scito te Ipsum, demonstrating that the words
have clear and distinct meanings. This will be heavily predicated upon Abelard’s
“Gospel of Intention” outlined in Chapter 1. Though this is difficult to detect in
Abelard’s prose, the distinction is present and crucial for getting the whole of his ethics
correct. Last, I will consider how Abelard’s conception of moral praise is intricately tied
to his understanding of salvific merit—his conception of sanctification and eventual
salvation. This can be shown by looking at the asymmetry between moral praise and
moral blame: they do not have the same sufficient conditions. While his account of
moral blame is dependent upon consent—a mere agreeableness of the will—and does
not require that one desires something unlawful. In other words, someone can sin with
no bad desire present, but a mere choice that violates the law. Abelard’s understanding
of moral praise rests upon intention, not consent. Resulting from this re-reading of
Abelard’s ethics will be a clear distinction between intention and consent and a clear
and distinct appraisal of moral praise and blame.
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I.

A History of Conflation
With the exception of Margaret Cameron, who noted in a recent article on

Abelard’s ethics that intentio and consensus ought to be considered separate terms,
nearly all recent secondary literature conflates the two.41Because Peter King’s article on
Abelard’s ethics influences later conflations of the terms in the secondary literature, I
will begin with his reading and consider how it might be amiss. Following my
evaluation of King, I will consider Calvin Normore, Ian Wilks, Jeffery Hause, William
Mann and Jean Porter as continuing the history of conflation in the literature.
King’s reading suggests that an intention is a consent to a given action with
motivational force. In other words, I intend to x if and only if I consent to x and plan on
carrying out x. In this way, an intention is a strong version of consent. One could even
understand intention as a plan to perform a given action, akin to Anscombe’s intentionfor-future. Peter King makes this claim, as in the following in the fourth footnote of
“Abelard’s Intentionalist Ethics”:
Abelard isn’t very careful about the distinction between consent and
intention. It seems as though an intention is a here-and-now desire to ϕ.
Consent to a desire seems to produce an intention, which we may think of
as a here-and-now desire to ϕ that has motivational force. But it is an odd
sort of ‘desire,’ since it is intellectual. It is not clear to me that Abelard has
Cameron, Margaret. "Abelard (and Heloise?) on Intention." American Catholic Philosophical
Quarterly 81, no. 2 (2007): 323-338. Though Cameron notes this, it is a claim made in passing. She does not
spend time demonstrating why she believes this to be the case or relishing in the consequences of
understanding the terms as synonymous. In addition, Robert Blomme, La doctrine du pecht? dans les ecoles
theofogiques de fa premiere moitie du XIIe siecle (Louvain: Publications universitaires de Louvain, 1958), 13336, notes that consensus and intentio ought to be considered separate terms. Similar to Cameron, this is a
claim made in passing, as if a side note.
41

45

a theory to back up his admittedly intuitive use of ‘consent’ and
‘intention.’42
King argues that intention is an intellectual plan to perform action x but makes the
admission that this does not seem to fit with the overall theory Abelard presents. He
resolves to continue utilizing Abelard’s own intuitive use of intention in his analysis,
making no effort to further delineate between consent and intention.
Now, if one understands Abelard’s use of intention is such a way, it is difficult to
distinguish intention from consent as Abelard defines it—“when we in no way draw
back from its accomplishment and are inwardly ready, if given the chance, to do it” (Sc.
14:17-19). If intention is a plan, or a current desire with motivational force, and consent
is an agreeableness of the will, then intention only differs from consent in its necessarily
future orientation or it’s motivational quality; it will, invariably, include the act of
consenting. This leads to a rather indistinguishable picture of the pair.
The issue with King’s interpretation is that it cannot be supported by the text, a
point he seems to acknowledge himself. There does not seem to be any indication in
Scito te Ipsum, or in any of Abelard’s other writings, that intention is akin to consent
with motivational force. Abelard gives no explicit indication of this. Moreover, it is not
implied in the way Abelard uses intention either—a point that will be belabored later.
Interestingly, King’s reading has paved the way for many later readings of Abelard’s
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King, “Abelard’s Intentionalist Ethics,” 2
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ethics. Most of the interpretations I will be discussing next cite King in their attempts to
outline Scito te Ipsum specifically and in their summaries of Abelard’s ethics generally.
The first of these more recent readings of Abelard’s ethics I will be discussing is
Calvin Normore. Normore claims, “Consenting to or intending what one believes
erroneously not to be what should be done for God’s sake is bad, and so such an
intention is a bad intention.”43 Normore’s suggestion is that consent to a given action is
synonymous with intending to perform an action. Both consenting to an action and
intending to perform an action imply an agreeableness of the will—an action of the
mind that does not necessarily culminate in the physical performance of an act.
Interestingly, this leads Normore’s evaluation of Abelard to be quite Stoic. He claims,
rather boldly, that, “Peter Abelard is as close to Stoicism as a Christian could be.” 44
According to Normore, both Abelard and the Stoic see virtuous, or morally
praiseworthy, action resulting from a struggle against desire and concupiscence. At
worst, desire, emotion, and the like are the enemies of virtue.45 At best, they are merely
not constitutive of it. Regardless, the affective orientation of the agent has no bearing on
the morality of acts.
Ian Wilks’s reading relies on this same conflation of terms:

Normore, Calvin. “Abelard’s Stoicism and Its Consequences,” in Thomas Mathien & D. G.
Wright (eds.), Autobiography as Philosophy: The Philosophical Uses of Self-Presentation. (Routledge, 2006).
44 Ibid, 132
45 Though this is not necessarily incorrect, in my view, it is not the full story.
43

47

Abelard is left only with what we have consented to do, what we have
intended to do, as being worthy of moral consideration. Our consents and
intentions (the words are used more or less interchangeably) render the full
account of all the sins we have committed in our lives, and it is to these, no
farther, that God will look in passing final judgement.46
Like Normore, Wilks does not distinguish intention from consent and uses the terms
interchangeably throughout his article. The seamless connection between the two terms
results in the very same status of the passions espoused by Normore: desire or the
affective quality of an act (be it interiorly conceived or externally performed) has
nothing to do with praiseworthiness of agents. Instead, praiseworthiness is merely
dependent upon choice of the will. This, according to both Normore and Wilks, is
conveyed by both the words intention and consensus. Though Wilks does not make the
explicit comparison to Stoicism, his interpretation of Abelard’s ethics procures the same
evaluative claim as Normore’s reading.
Porter, like Normore and Wilks, concludes that Abelard places no particular
importance on desire, or the agent’s affective inclination. She begins her article on
Abelard’s ethics by stating, “In this article, I will examine Abelard's account of moral
intention, or better, consent, in light of recent work on his own thought and the twelfthcentury background of that thought.”47 She continues using intention and consent as if
they had no systematic distinction and resolves that Abelard is strikingly proto-

Wilks, Ian. “The Role of Virtue Theory and Natural Law in Abelard’s Ethical Writings.”
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1997): 137-149.
47 Porter, 369.
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Kantian, as he presents an ethic of “pure reason.” While Porter’s picture doesn’t include
a Stoic comparison, she includes Kant for the very same reason that others conceive
Abelard to be Stoic: the de-emphasis on emotion or the affective inclination motivating
action.
This trend continues in most other readings of Scito te Ipsum. Jeffrey Hause, for
instance, presents a detailed examination of Abelard’s conception of sin. However, he
explicitly denies any clear distinction between consent and intention. Though
considering it possible to imagine the two words being distinct, he quickly dismisses
the idea, claiming, “I do not think we can abstract from this one occurrence a general
distinction between intentio and consensus.” 48Finally, in William Mann’s reading, which
appears in the Cambridge Companion, he considers intention and consent nominally
distinct, but the definitions of the two rely on each other in a way that makes it
impossible to distinguish them in actuality. Intending action x requires consent of action
x. Therefore, there can be no intending x without consenting x. Thus, his definition of
intention engulfs consent: “Abelard suggests that to form an intention to do something
is to consent to that thing.”49

Hause, Jeffrey. "Abelard on Degrees of Sinfulness." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 81,
no. 2 (2007): 251-270.
49 Mann, William. “Ethics,” in The Cambridge Campaign to Abelard, Ed. By Jeffrey Brower.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 285.
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Again, all five of these readings fail to make any clear distinction, or any
distinction at all, between Abelard’s use of consent and Abelard’s use of intention. On
this reading, a passionless picture of Abelardian ethics emerges, leading many to find
his contribution to the ethical discourse underwhelming. He is read as an unsuccessful
attempt to baptize Stoic ethics or as a less compelling version of Kant. In any case, two
things are unanimous among the interpreters mentioned above: (1) Abelard makes no
distinction between intending and consenting and (2) Abelard dismisses the importance
of the passions or affective inclinations in determining the moral quality of acts.
Hopefully it is clear that the conflation of intention and consent in Abelard’s
ethics is normative throughout Abelardian scholarship.50 To be fair, Abelard does not
provide a clear definition for intentio in Scito te Ipsum. This does not appear to be a lazy
error or lack of systematic precision. Instead, it seems Abelard assumes his readers,
universally Christian and likely religious, are familiar with the word intentio and its
spiritual sense. Intention is not the new concept Abelard is introducing or trying to
clarify; consent is. Abelard is attempting to explain the possibility of sin where no bad
will or desire is present, a clear extrapolation and elucidation of the Augustinian

At the Medieval Philosophy Network at the University of London (April 2019), John Marenbon
pointed out that this observation might be more appropriately said of American Abelard scholarship
generally. This has resulted, as I argue here, because of American scholarship’s dependence upon King’s
article for a general and accurate summary of Abelard’s ethics. Thus, the Kantian association has been
recycled and perpetuated. This is important to note because many Abelard scholars, such as Constant
Mews and Marenbon himself do not explicit associate Abelard with Kant.
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account of sin which attempts to define sin as a mala voluntas. Therefore, Abelard is
explicit in defining consent and does not seem similarly compelled to define intention.
In the following section I will provide clear and distinct definitions for both
intention and consent as they are employed in Sctio te Ipsum. In an effort to be
transparent, the definition of intention I presume is undeniably informed by the
Commentary on Romans, written before Sctio te Ipsum. As such, I will recall the use of
intention I demonstrated in the previous chapter to elucidate Abelard’s use of intention
in Sctio te Ipsum.
II.

Re-Examining Intention and Consent
If we supply the view of intention I argue for, one informed by his Commentary

on Romans, Abelard’s ethics looks quite different. First though, let us consider consent.
Abelard uses the word “consensus” in Scito te Ipsum as a technical term to convey an
agreeableness of the will—“when we in no way draw back from its accomplishment
and are inwardly ready, if given the chance, to do it” (Sc. 14:16-18). One can, according
to Abelard, consent to action without a bad will or bad desire. Abelard’s most cited
example is that of a servant who is running from his angry Master who wants to kill
him. 51 The servant runs as long as he can but is eventually faced with the reality that he
may have to kill his Master in order to save his own life. So, the servant consents to kill
his Master, but does not do so with a desire to commit a murder. Instead, he does so
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See: Sc. 6:25-8:5.
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with the desire to preserve his own life. This desire or will to preserve life is not a bad
one. Even though this desire is not bad, the servant still commits sin by consenting to an
unlawful killing. So then, a sin has been committed without a bad will. This does not
mean though, that desire qua desire is morally neutral. Abelard never suggests as much.
Instead, he makes the point that consent to sin can occur even when no bad will is
present.
We can view consents to lawful or seemingly “good” actions in the same way.
Just as one can consent to a bad action with no bad will, one can consent to a lawful act
with an evil, carnal, or unqualifiedly bad desire. As a result, consent to what is lawful
does not denote a good action. Abelard gives several examples of this, but he
consistently returns, in both the Romans Commentary and the Scito te Ipsum, to Judas
delivering up the Son—Christ—and the God the Father delivering up His Son:
The giving up of the Son was certainly done by God the Father; and it was
done by the Son and it was done by that betrayer, since both the Father and
delivered up the Son and the Son delivered up himself, as the Apostle
observed, and Judas delivered up the Master. So the betrayer did what God
also did, but surely he did not do it well? For although what was done was
good, it certainly was not well done nor should it have benefited him. For
God thinks not of what is done but in what mind (animo) it may be done,
and the merit or glory of the doer lies in the intention, not in the deed (Sc.
28:5-17).
This is an example Abelard takes directly from Augustine’s homily on John 7:7, which
is quoted in his very own Sic et Non. Here, what separates Judas’s “giving up of the
Son” and God’s “giving up of the Son,” is why they performed the act. God gave up
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himself as an act of love—love motivated or prompted the sacrifice. Judas gave up
Christ because of his own greed, because he desired thirty pieces of silver for himself. In
order to describe the distinction between these various acts, Abelard appeals to the term
“intentio.” Now, let us be careful to explain what, exactly, an intentio is.
As Elizabeth Anscombe reminded analytic philosophy in 1957, the word
“intention” can be understood in a variety of ways. Anscombe brings to light three
intimately related descriptions of intention: intentional action, intention for future, and
intention-with-which. If I were to say, “I intentionally hit the ball,” I would be describing
an intentional action. Intention under this description corresponds to a meaning-to
perform action x. In other words, it is a voluntary act. Intention-for-future implies a plan
for a future action. For instance, if I were to say, “I intend to get a drink after work,” the
word “intention” implies that I am planning to have a drink once I am off work. Finally,
an intention with which is an agent’s reason or purpose with which they act. If I were to
ask Peter, “Why did you buy Lucy flowers?” he may respond by providing the reason
or purpose he did so—an intention-with which. Perhaps it was to let her know he was
thinking about her or to congratulate her for a recent promotion. In any case, an
intention-with-which answers the question “why?” Anscombe’s point is not to provide a
theory of intention but give a description of how the word is used in ordinary language.
Anscombe’s account of intention is helpful in understanding what Abelard is not
saying. When Abelard speaks of intention he does not mean to convey an intentional
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action—one an agent meant to do. Abelard does not use intentio to convey a plan
either—to set one’s mind on doing some action at future time t. Lastly, Abelard is not
describing the reason one performs an action. That is, if “reason” is taken to be an
intellectual justification or description of motive. Essentially, Abelard does not use
intention to convey voluntariness, a plan, or a reason one supplies for acting. Let us
apply these distinctions the example above. When Abelard points to God’s intention in
“delivering up the son” he does not mean to convey that God planned on delivering up
the Son, God meant to deliver up the Son, or that that God delivered up the Son for a
particular reason.
Instead, Abelard uses the word intentio to relay something deeply affective and
spiritual. An intention is what one desires or wants in acting. It still answers the
question “why?” but appeals to affections in order to answer that question.52 So here we
have a sort of intention that is not reflected in Anscombe’s typology; it is a “Why”
account of a different kind. This is apparent in the Commentary on Romans:
Therefore, he is also said to be the tester of the heart and mind to see into
what is concealed. In this passage, he substitutes the work for the inner
disposition of the work, when the term is transferred from the effect to the
cause. Otherwise, the judgment of God might not be shown to be equitable,
since the works are indifferent in themselves, that is, neither good nor evil,
or they seem worthy of recompense, except according to the root of the
intention, that is, the tree producing good or evil fruit. So then, when he

It is worth noting that Anscombe understands an intention-with-which as the first premise of a
practical syllogism. She claims that if this “reason” is to be acted upon that it must be wanted. So, in a
way, Anscombe is making a claim that intentions are only genuine if they are wanted. Otherwise, they
are merely idealistic ways we want to conceptualize our actions.
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says ACCORDING TO HIS WORKS it is as if he would say according to
their will—what they desire to happen or not to happen.53 (Comm Rom. I.2.6,
126)
Here Abelard suggests that, indeed, works are indifferent in themselves. This is because
they only receive their merit in reference to the intention that serves as their cause,
source, or “root.” This root of intention, which defines the nature or quality of the work,
is described as what one “desires to happen or not to happen” (quae fieri uel non, fieri
appetunt). This is distinct from a reason for acting, which may refer to the justification an
agent provides for doing
The connection between desire and intention reappears throughout the Romans
Commentary, but one of the most explicit passages is from the Quaestio following
Abelard’s Exegesis of Romans 7:6:
Truth says through himself, “You have heard that it was said to the
ancients,” etc., and, “Unless your righteousness abounds,” etc., its reward
could not be perfect; neither were heavenly things suitable for earthly
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I diverge from Cartwright’s translation of “Unde et ipse probator cordis et renum in abscondito
uidere dicitur.” He translates this sentence as such: “Therefore, he is also said to be the tester of the heart
and the kidneys and to see into what is concealed.” He translates renum as kidneys. Though this is a
literal translation, it fails to convey the sense of the passage, as judging the “kidneys” is nonsensical in
English and would leave the modern reader baffled. Instead, I have translated it as “mind.” Peter Abelard
uses this language often—God is the tester of one’s heart, mind, the spirit, of the work, etc. In addition,
Cartwright adds an extra “and” presumably because it appears after Unde. Here, I think the “also”
satisfies the first “et.” Thus, I removed the second and that Cartwright supplies after “kidneys.” In
addition, I have reconstructed the last sentence of this passage: Tale est ergo quod ait SECUNDUM OPERA
EIUS ac si diceret secundum uoluntatem eorum quae fieri uel non, fieri appetunt. Cartwright’s translation reads:
“Such it is, therefore, that he says ACCORDING TO HIS WORKS, as if he should say, according to the
will of those things that they desire to happen or not to happen.” I have chosen to not personify will as
having a desire, but instead translate the last phrase as a restatement of what Abelard means by saying
“according to their will.” So, my translation is as follows: “So then, when he says ACCORDING TO HIS
WORKS it is as if he would say according to their will—what they desire to happen or not happen.”
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desires (desideriis), nor can someone be fit for God who serves as much for
earthly things as for heavenly ones. (Comm Rom. III.7.6, 243)
Very similar language is used in Scito te Ipsum:
God is said to be the prover of the heart and the reins, that is, of all the
intentions which come from an affection of the soul (affectione animae) or
from a weakness or a pleasure of the flesh (delectatione carnis) (Sc. 41:17-19).
The ethical claim is consistent in both passages: righteousness does not consist in the
mere completion of works. If we want to understand our actions we must look at what
we desire in our performance of them—spiritual or carnal goods? Are you keen on
performing your religious duties so you can impress a particularly devout romantic
interest? “Well,” Abelard might say, “it looks like you desire the romantic interest and
not God.” In other words, the intentional object in the performance of such an act is the
romantic interest because the romantic interest is desired. In this circumstance
obedience to God is nothing more than self-interest. Abelard goes so far as to say that
our intentions, and thus our actions, are not worthy of praise unless they are pure—
God alone should be desired in them. So, this love must be, if one’s righteousness
abounds, the only, or most dominant, intention in action. Surely, the Augustinian echo
can be heard in his words—only God is to be enjoyed.54

See: De Doctrina Christiana, I.22.20, trans. John J. Gavigan, O.S.A. (New City Press: 1996): “Thus
all of your thoughts and your whole life and intelligence should be focused on him from whom you
received the very things you devote to him. Now, when he said with your whole heart, your whole soul,
your whole mind, he did not leave out any part of our life, which could be left vacant, so to speak, and
leave room for wanting to enjoy something else. Instead, whatever else occurs to you as fit to be loved
must be whisked along toward that point to which the whole impetus of your love is hastening.”
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I should also be clear in pointing out that intention is not synonymous with
desire. In other words, we must keep in mind the influence of Augustine when piecing
together Abelard’s conception of intention, which I outlined in the previous chapter. An
intention is not merely something one desires; it is the dominant desire that grants
motivational identity to the agent. In other words, it is entirely possible that one has a
desire for something without a corresponding intention for it. For one could want or
desire many things simultaneously.
To explain, let us examine the event of going to the gym. I could want to go to
the gym because I desire to be healthy and, at the same time, want to go to the gym
because I desire to be attractive. In such an instance, the desire to be healthy is perfectly
lawful, while the desire to be attractive may be fed by vanity or lust. Given the presence
of both these desires, which one serves as my intention? In Abelard’s language, is my
going to the gym primarily fed by carnal or spiritual desire? Unfortunately, desires
cannot be weighed like bricks and dissected like chemical compounds. We cannot
perfectly demarcate them—two-parts carnal, one-part spiritual. Unless one knows
oneself impeccably well, the process of sniffing out and identifying our actual intentions
is quite difficult, near impossible. Nonetheless, the intention of an agent is their most
dominant desire. If one yearns for health and attractiveness in equal measure, we can
hardly speak of the agent being intentional. The sheer diversity of desire generates a
kind of cooling effect—one is not on fire for any one thing, scattered, unfocused. The
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author of Revelations calls this being “lukewarm.”55 Augustine calls it “distention.”56
On the contrary, the stronger one given desire grows, the more the others dwindle and
become inconsequential. For example, a great love for one’s children might render a
father’s own selfish desires obsolete. They may not be completely extinguished, but
they are not nearly as influential in one’s decision making.
To review, I have pointed out that consent is merely an agreeableness of the will.
It is an internal quality of the agent who might be described as having a willingness or
readiness to perform a particular action if the opportunity to do so arises. One consents
to adultery, for instance, when one is ready to perform the adulterous act if they are
given the opportunity to do so. On would be, as Abelard sees it, just as guilty for such a
consent as the man who actually completes the physical act. Intention, on the other
hand, has nothing to do with voluntariness or agreeableness, per se. Abelard uses

See: “So because you are lukewarm, and neither hot nor cold, I will spit you out of My mouth”
(Rev. 3:16). The following passages imply the same: “He who is not with Me is against Me; and he who
does not gather with Me, scatters.” (Lk. 11:23). “No one can serve two masters; for either he will hate the
one and love the other, or he will be devoted to one and despise the other. You cannot serve God and
wealth” (Mt. 6:24, Lk. 16:13).
56 See: Conf. 29:39, trans. Thomas Williams, (Hackett, 2019): “Yet because your mercy is better
than lives, (Ps. 62:4) behold, my life is a distention, and your right hand has lifted me up in my Lord, the
Son of Man, the Mediator (1 Tim. 2:5) between you, who are one, and us, who are many—with many
distractions about many things—so that through him I might grasp the one who also has me in his grasp,
and from the fragments of days past be gathered up to follow the One, forgetting those things that are
past, and not stretched out through distention but straining forward in intention to the things that lie
ahead (not to future things that are but fleeting), I press on toward the prize of the upward call, (Phil.
3:12–14) where I will hear the voice of praise (Ps. 25:7) and gaze upon your delight, (Ps. 26:4) which
neither comes to be nor passes away.”
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intention to describe the affective orientation of the agent—what they want or desire
most.
Though sometimes this is used to refer to the intention of an act, it should be
kept in mind that we cannot separate the intention of acts from the intention of the
agent. Therefore, the intention of the agent yields the intention of particular acts, not
vice versa. We cannot speak of an action being done with an intention of love if the
agent does not possess love for the intentional object—the former inextricably follows
the latter. Acts can only be intentional if the person performing them has a motivational
identity, an intention. I also explained that although intention connotes desire, it is not
synonymous with desire. As we explored in the previous chapter, one can have
multiple desires concurrently. Intentions are dominant desires, not desires generally
speaking. Mixed intentions, as Abelard calls them, are when there is no apparent
dominant desire.
III.

Blameworthiness and Praiseworthiness
The distinction between intention and consent does not gravely impact Abelard’s

account of sin or how it has been outlined in the secondary literature. Sin is not
synonymous with a bad will or a bad desire. Sin simply requires consent to what is
unlawful—that is, what the natural law forbids according to one’s own conscience.
Abelard makes clear that there are certainly cases in which desires do not necessarily
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denote blame. As many in the secondary literature have already pointed out, he
excludes both desire and mental vice as being occasions of sin.57
In the case of desire not being sufficient for sin, Abelard uses the example of a
man who finds himself traveling through another man’s garden and is seduced by the
delightful smell of fruit (Sc.14:6-14). Though the man may posses the vice of gluttony
and be so desirous for the fruit, he can refuse to eat it. That is, the man can repress his
desire and withhold consent. In this instance the desire is not cause for blame. As
Abelard claims, “It shows in short that in such things also the will itself or the desire
(desiderium) to do what is unlawful is by no means to be called a sin, but rather, as we
have stated, the consent itself” (Sc. 14:15-16). However, this does not mean desire is
altogether irrelevant in the evaluation of acts or persons. It simply means that a bad
desire is not synonymous with a sin. A similar point is made with mental vice. Though
someone may be prone to anger, it does not mean they will always consent to their
anger—be ready to act on it should the opportunity arise. They are blameworthy if and
only if they consent to that which is unlawful. However, this does not render vice
irrelevant in our evaluations of acts. It simply means that it inclines but does not
determine human action.

See: Hause, Jeffrey. "Abelard on Degrees of Sinfulness." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly
no. 2 (2007): 252-270.
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Most importantly, Abelard is lobbying for a move away from absolutist
evaluations of acts. He assures that acts can be done that are, technically speaking, bad
but they may not be consented to, making them not worthy of blame. Someone may,
Abelard contends, sleep with someone who is not their wife while thinking that they
are (Sc. 24:11-12) (Though, I have a hard time buying this; apparently, wives were all
too gullible in twelfth century France). In such an instance, the person commits an act
that is forbidden but did not consent to the action which is forbidden. They consented
to sleeping with their wife but did something rather different: committed adultery. In
other words, they did not agree to do something unlawful and are not culpable as a
result. This leads Abelard to the conclude that prohibitions of acts are really in reference
to the consent of such acts, not the performance of them: “If we carefully consider also
all the occasions where actions seem to come under a commandment or a prohibition,
these must be taken to refer to the will or to consent to actions rather to the actions
themselves” (Sc. 24:25-27). Clearly consent to what is unlawful is sufficient for moral
blame.
In conflating intention and consent, many have assumed that Abelard’s criterion
for moral blame is analogous to his criterion for moral praise; however, it is not. In what
follows I will demonstrate that praiseworthiness for Abelard is dependent upon the
agent’s intention—affective orientation or motivational identity. A good intention,
insofar as Abelard is concerned, is born of charity—love for God for the sake of himself.
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Moreover, consent may be present without a corresponding bad desire, but a good
intention is necessarily predicated upon an affection for God. As a result, moral blame
may not necessitate a bad desire, but moral praise necessitates an actual affection for
God. In the context of demonstrating these premises, I will first clearly outline a
negative account of moral praise, namely what praiseworthiness is not for Abelard.
Then, I will point to the fact that we must consider Abelard’s account of moral praise
alongside his account of salvific merit, for they are one and the same—both depend,
almost entirely, on caritas. In the context of this discussion, I will suggest that caritas
both secures the classical requirements for virtue and addresses traditional theological
concerns about soteriological merit. This should highlight the fact that Abelard’s ethical
account is unintelligible apart from his theological project.
Before delving into the positive account of moral praise, let me explicitly outline
what it is not. First, praiseworthiness of agents does not correspond to the sum total of
their consents, good or bad. In other words, my praiseworthiness as an agent is not
directly correlated to the number of times I consent to sin, the number or times I am
able to positively refrain, or the number of times I choose to do good. This, certainly,
would be a very Pelagian system of moral praiseworthiness. Fortunately, it is not
Abelard’s, though some, such as Ian Wilks, seem to have suggested as much. God does
not, according to Abelard, weigh moral praiseworthiness by but putting us on a scale
and ensuring our good consents (or acts) outweigh the bad. Who we are is not
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synonymous with what we do. Sometimes saints act sinful; sometimes sinners act
saintly. Most importantly, sometimes saints are prevented from acting saintly—the
means necessary to do so are not available, for instance.
Second, moral praise is not incurred through obedience. This point cannot be
emphasized enough. Considering Abelard’s reading of the Gospel as espoused in
Chapter 1, this should be especially clear. This is, again, for the very same reasons that
praiseworthiness of agents is not determined by the sum total of one’s acts: Abelard’s
ethic is a Christian ethic. In other words, praiseworthiness is not reducible to what one
does. Unlike Sartre contends, the totality of Proust’s genius is not the totality of Proust’s
works. Obedience, as Abelard makes clear in the Commentary on Romans, can be
motivated by a variety of loves, desires, or concerns. I can obey my mother because I
fear punishment, because I hate confrontation, or because I love her, for example.
Obedience, or consent to obey, says nothing about who I am unless it is substantially
qualified. It merely points to what one does or chooses.
As I have made clear, moral praise is not synonymous with the completion of
many good works or obedience generally speaking. In contrast to moral blame, moral
praise is determined by what one desires in acting or what affections motivate the
performance of an action—the key word is intention, not consent. This emphasis on
intention points towards a concern with the affective attachments of an agent. Such
affections are not subject to change by choice; they are intimately part of our person—
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characteristics of the soul. As a result, there is no clear distinction in Sctio te Ipsum
between someone who is morally praiseworthy and someone who is authentically
Christian. Charity is the source of both virtue and salvation, satisfying both the
classical, philosophical requirements for virtue and the traditional, theological
requirements for salvation. Let us explore each of these to provide a comprehensive
picture of moral praise for Abelard.
In all varieties of virtue ethics there is an obvious concern for how actions are
done not simply that they are done. Being a good person does not amount to doing
good things, it requires that they are done with a very specific disposition and with a
concern for certain ends. Depending on whether one is a Stoic, Aristotelian, or
Epicurean, these ends may vary drastically. However, a concern for certain ends is a
necessary prerequisite. Furthermore, the virtuous person is clearly distinct from the
continent person. Doing something well means doing it with ease. The moral exemplar
does not struggle to do what is right. Instead, doing what is just, temperate, or
fortuitous becomes second nature. In other words, making good choices is anything but
a struggle. How one accomplishes this difficult feat is the meat of debate between the
various classical schools. How does one become virtuous? Though Abelard borrows
from both the Aristotelian and Stoic accounts of virtue, his answer is neither
Aristotelian nor Stoic.

64

Abelard’s answer to the character gap is caritas—it is how one becomes virtuous,
good, worthy of praise. Love for God satisfies the requirements for virtue outlined
above: it constitutes (1) a concern for some proper end and (2) makes it easy to do what
is just, temperate, or courageous. Insofar as (1) is concerned, Abelard discusses having
proper care for proper ends in terms of intentionality—having an affection for
particular, direct objects, those which receive action. He makes this especially clear in
his Commentary on Romans, a point belabored in Chapter 1. In love for God, God
becomes the end purpose or goal of our acts. Love for God constitutes a concern, a care
for God that motivates action, just like care or concern for one’s children disposes a
mother or a father to act for them. This ought not to be confused with an intellectual
acknowledgment that God ought to be obeyed because he is maximally great nor as
respect for some Platonic form of Justice.58 Love is an affection for God made possible
through the passion of Christ.59
This can be seen in a lengthy, and often forgotten discussion, towards the end of
Scito te Ipsum in which Abelard discloses sufficient conditions for fruitful repentance,
appealing to the same dichotomy of love and fear that is so prevalent in the Commentary
on Romans. Expanding upon the words of the Apostle Paul, he claims, “With these

Abelard struggles to find a place for virtuous pagans in his ethics because he rejects the views I
articulated here. He believes knowledge and love of Christ is a necessary condition for salvific merit. He
fashions all sorts of creative ways to try and have his cake (the priority of charity) and eat it too (make
room for pagans in the salvation economy).
59 As I will argue later, this is even reflected in Abelard’s theory of atonement.
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words he plainly declares what is wholesome repentance, proceeding from the love of
God rather than from fear, with the result that we are sorry to have offended or to have
shown contempt of God because he is good rather than because he is just” (Sc. 84:27-30).
Love of God makes the penitent. Without such love, sorrow for one’s sin is merely a
reflection of self-interest. Instead of being concerned for God and her relationship to
God, she merely is sorry that she has failed, that she may be punished, that her
reputation may suffer.
Love also perfectly satisfies requirements for (2) as well—it makes doing what is
good easier. Abelard explains this phenomenon in Scito te Ipsum:
Whence the Lord exhorts those who labour and are burdened to take up the
sweet yoke and a light burden, in order, that is, to pass from subjection to
the law by which they are oppressed to the freedom of the Gospel; and they
who had started from fear may be perfected in charity, which without
difficulty beareth all things, endureth all things. Nothing indeed is difficult
to a lover, especially since the spiritual and not carnal love of God is so
much stronger for being more true (Sc. 72: 10-16).
Love has a funny way of making easy things that would otherwise be difficult. Love
makes us ready to give, to sacrifice, to lay down our lives when we ordinarily would
struggle to do so. Though you may hate public speaking, you figure out a way to give a
speech at your best friend’s wedding. Though you may not be a fan of ballet, you figure
out a way to sit through an entire performance for your partner—because they adore it.
Though you may not enjoy talking on the phone, you go out of your way to phone your
college roommate and stay in touch. Without such affections, similar sacrifices are not
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sweet yokes or light burdens—they are miserable obligations that must be fulfilled.
Love for God procures an inclination to do what is good, removing the struggle that
persists in its absence. Being virtuous, in other words, becomes easier. This is precisely
Abelard’s point. So then, love bridges the gap between ideal and performance. It orients
the agent by providing affectionate focus—intention—and thereby lifting the burden of
the law.
Caritas also buries the perpetual Augustinian concern about merit—the antiPelagian preoccupation with pure giftedness. Love says nothing about the goodness of
ourselves, but points towards the goodness of the object. The person of Christ is so
gripping because he is infinitely good, infinitely perfect and thus the rightful object of
our affectionate gaze. Ultimately, love is not earned; it is the appropriate response to
who God is. Furthermore, it means that praiseworthiness is said of persons, not acts.
This is because acts always proceed from persons and their hearts; they are informed by
the agent’s intentions, desires, etc. Why? Per the Gospel, people are saved because of
their transformation in Christ, not because they have performed many good actions.
Charity, quite literally, is one’s saving grace.
In this section I have shown that consent and intention are distinct concepts in
Abelard’s corpus, particularly in the Commentary on Romans and Scito te Ipsum. To be
clear, Abelard maintains that consenting to an action propter Deum means actually
loving God in that action—a movement of the soul towards God on account of his
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goodness. The merit of any human action rests upon this being the case. To avoid any
misunderstanding, it may be helpful to recall what loving God is not. One does not love
God by understanding that they should. One does not love God by claiming or
declaring they perform an action for God’s sake. Even forsaking one’s desire because
they know that God commands it is not meritorious per se; this would suggest suffering
qua suffering is praiseworthy. Finally, one does not love God because they are willing to
obey his law. For, on that account, what fault could we find in the Pharisee? Surely,
such a willingness would be present in one who loves God; however, that criterion
alone is not a sufficient description of caritas.
IV.

Conclusions
In this chapter I have demonstrated the source of much confusion in readings of

Abelard’s ethics. Though many posit that intention and consent have no systematic
distinction in Scito te Ipsum, I argue that consent is a mere agreeableness of the will—a
readiness to perform an action given the opportunity to do so arise—and that intention
is akin to the motivational identity of the agent—determined by one’s greatest love or
desire. As result, Abelard’s ethical account looks a bit different. Instead of moral praise
being determined by consent to what is prudently determined to be lawful, moral
praise depends upon the affective orientation of the agent, the intentional object of their
action. This makes the Christian bar for moral praise is quite high—it demands that our
actions come forth from a charitable heart, one enflamed by the fire of caritas. Love of
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God orients our focus on the proper end, lifts the burden of the law, and assures that
God alone is the cause of salvation. Thus, Abelard’s account of moral praise becomes
one with his understanding of salvific merit. To be good is to be freely Christian.
“Certainly, if virtue is understood in its proper sense, as that which obtains merit with
God, charity alone is to be called a virtue” (Coll. II, 100).60
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CHAPTER THREE:
ABELARD IS NOT A PROTO-KANTIAN

Kant is well-known for his emphasis on duty as a sufficient condition for moral
praise. In other words, performing an action for duty’s sake makes a moral agent
praiseworthy. This Kantian claim is of particular interest in this chapter, precisely
because many interpreters believe Abelard to be proto-Kantian in this regard. For
example, Peter King argues “Abelard and Kant locate moral worth in features of the
way the agent conceptualizes her performances, and each thinks that goodness is
characterizable in terms of the form such conceptualization takes.”61 As a result, King
claims that Abelard’s ethics can be described as a “medieval categorical imperative.” 62
Others, such as Jean Porter, have followed King’s lead, distancing Abelard from his
Augustinian roots and likening him to a medieval Kantian. Like King, Porter argues
that Abelard’s ethics is reminiscent of Kantian deontology precisely because it regards
the passions as morally neutral: “What Abelard offers, in short, is a theologically
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King, Peter. “Abelard’s Intentionalist Ethics.” The Modern Schoolman 72 (1995): 214.
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grounded case for the moral neutrality of the passions.”63 She later posits, “It might be
said that Abelard's reading of Scripture leads him to a theory of morality that he could
just as well have developed on the basis of pure philosophical reason, much as Kant
was later to do.”64 In other words, both King and Porter claim that Abelard is
remarkably proto-Kantian.
In contrast to these interpreters, I claim that Abelard does not have the same
reverence for sheer duty and its sufficiency for moral praise that appears in the Kantian
ethic. Moreover, Abelard does not assess moral goodness through consideration of the
agent’s conceptualization of their act. Thus, this chapter will be primarily dedicated to
detailing Kant’s account of moral praise and showing how Abelard’s ethic diverges
greatly from it. I will accomplish this by demonstrating, against the proto-Kantian
interpretation, that Abelard does not view the passions as morally neutral or have an
intellectualist understanding of intention or motive.
I.

Moral Praise in Kant’s Ethics
For the purposes of this argument, the only relevant piece of the Kantian ethical

system is Kant’s account of moral praiseworthiness. In other words, here I will not be
concerned with how Kant determines that a given action ought to be done, but what
makes an agent worthy of praise for completion of a dutiful act. On this point Kant is

Porter, Jean. "Responsibility, Passion, and Sin: A Reassessment of Abelard's Ethics." Journal of
Religious Ethics 28, no. 3 (2000): 390.
64 Ibid, 392.
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infamous for his claim that emotions or inclinations in acting are morally neutral and
should not be the basis of praise or blame, incurring the wrath of avowed virtue and
care ethicists. The most explicit example of this claim can be found in Chapter 1 of the
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. This example has become known as the coldhearted benefactor:
Thus suppose the mind of that same friend of humanity were clouded over
with his own grief, extinguishing all his sympathetic participation in the
fate of others; he still has the resources to be beneficent to those suffering
distress, but the distress of other does not touch him because his is
sufficiently busy with his own; and now where no inclination any longer
stimulates him to it, he tears himself out of this deadly insensibility and
does the action without any inclination, solely from duty; only then does it
for the first time have its authentic moral worth.65
The implication of Kant’s words is clear: inclinations to perform action x do not make
agent A praiseworthy. On the contrary, the performance of a duty is praiseworthy if
and only if agent A performs action x because it is A’s duty, because it is the right thing
to do.
Kant goes on to explain that “an action from duty has its moral worth not in the
aim that is supposed to be attained by it, but rather the maxim in accordance with which
it is resolved upon; thus, worth depends not on the actuality of the object of action, but
merely on the principle of the volition in accordance with which the action is done,

Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. ed. and trans. Allen W. Wood. (Yale
University Press: 2002), 14. All page numbers in subsequent citations for the Groundwork will be in
reference to this translation.
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without any regard to any object of the faculty of desire.”66 Make no mistake, Kant’s
account of moral praise is not teleological. Moreover, the intentional object of one’s
desires is irrelevant. What does merit an agent moral praise? Acting in accordance with
the principle prescribed by reason because it has been prescribed by reason— an
austere commitment to the categorical imperative. Another way this can be explained in
ordinary language is that an agent incurs moral praise for the intention with which he
acts—why the agent performs the action. To return to the example of the cold-hearted
benefactor, if Kant’s benefactor discerns that he ought to give to the poor and thereafter
provides gives to the poor on the basis of that principle, then our benefactor has acted
well.
Of course, this presupposes that intention is regarded in a purely intellectual
manner—a reason or purpose one has for acting, akin to Anscombe’s account of
intention-with-which. In other words, it is the reason that the benefactor supplies for
acting, not the inclination or desire motivating the action. Thus, if one were to ask
Kant’s cold-hearted benefactor, “why did you provide assistance to the needy?” he
would reply, “because I know I ought to do so.” He would not be counted as
praiseworthy if he said, “because I have a deep affection for the poor and afflicted,” or
if he claimed, “I was moved to beneficence through sympathy.” These two latter
responses would suggest that the inclination or desire in the action was meritorious, not
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a choice to act in accordance with the prescribed ethical principle as determined by the
categorical imperative. As C.D. Meyers points out, “Even actions done from love or
sympathy have no moral worth for Kant because we cannot choose how we feel.”67
It is worth noting that there has been serious debate among Kantian scholars as
to whether or not dutiful motive must exclude the presence of emotion. For instance,
Julie Tannenbaum argues that one can act from the motive of duty while performing an
act compassionately. She claims this is clear once one’s reason for acting is clearly
distinguished from the way one acts. Marcia Baron maintains that acting from duty does
not exclude an inclination from pity, sympathy, etc.68 Going even further, she claims
that emotions are not altogether irrelevant in the Kantian schema; Kant even prescribes
duties to cultivate certain emotions in the Metaphysics of Morals. C.D. Meyers rejects
these “softened” appraisals of the Kantian ethic and claims that Kant means to suggest
the superiority of pure duty as a reason for acting. Regardless of the details, Kant’s
central claim remains the same: only action from duty merits praise. Persons are
regarded as good when they complete their duties because they feel the force of
obligation and succeed in carrying it out.

C. D., Meyers. "The Virtue of Cold-Heartedness." Philosophical Studies: An International Journal
For Philosophy In The Analytic Tradition no. 2 (2008): 233.
68 See: Marcia, Baron. "The Alleged Moral Repugnance of Acting from Duty." The Journal Of
Philosophy no. 4 (1984): 197-220. And Baron, Marcia “Acting From Duty,” in Groundwork for the
Metaphysics of Morals, ed. and trans. Allen Wood. (Yale University Press, 2002).
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Two central tenets of this Kantian account of moral praise are important for
comparison with Abelard. The first is the claim that emotions do not contribute to the
moral worth of actions or agents. If we recall, Jean Porter claims Abelard is Kantian in
this regard. The second is the claims motive or intention is understood as the reason one
has for acting; it is a matter of rational judgment, not of emotional inclination. A good
man, on this account, would be one who knows what he ought, does what he ought,
and does so because he ought. On this point, Peter King finds Abelard to be protoKantian: moral agents earn merit dependent upon how they conceptualize their actions.
In the following section I will show how Abelard’s ethics is not Kantian in either
respect.
II.

Moral Praise in Abelard
In order to demonstrate that neither of these claims is Abelard’s—that the

passions are morally neutral or that an agent is praiseworthy for how she
conceptualizes her actions—let us briefly recall Abelard’s understanding of consent and
intention outlined in the previous chapter. First, consent is a mere agreeableness of the
will. Consent, for Abelard, does not require that an action be performed, but that an
agent is ready to perform an action if the opportunity to do so presents itself. Such a
readiness can be made in contempt, that is, opposed to the natural law, or it can be
made in accordance with the natural law. This alone would be enough to understand
Abelard’s conception of sin. Sin is, strictly speaking, consent to act in opposition to the
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natural law. As a result, knowledge of the law and prudence to determine when it
applies are both necessary requirements to avoid the commission of sin. 69 This alone
though, does not suffice to perform good actions. In other words, for Abelard,
knowledge and prudence are not enough to constitute a good person; thus, it is not
enough to constitute a good action.
To understand Abelard’s conception of good persons and acts we must look
beyond consent; we must look to the other major theme of Abelard’s ethics: intention.
The concept of intentionality is not as straightforward as it initially seems. To the
modern ear, an intention is a “reason” that an action is performed. This is all well and
good if one is reading Kant; this is likely where the West received that notion in the first
place! However, it will not suffice if one is trying to understand a twelfth-century
monk. For Abelard, an intention corresponds to what one desires in the performance of
an action. We may even call an intention the affective cause of an act, one that joins the
actor to the object receiving action. Thus, affection links the actor and the direct object.
In determining what the intention of an agent is, the most proper question is, “What do
they love?” If one, for instance, donates money to a charitable organization, we must
ask why they do so. In asking why, Abelard would not be looking for the agent to

Abelard is famous for this point. He is adamant about the fact that knowledge is a necessary
condition for the commission of sin. His notorious example of this is not faulting those who condemned
Christ because they did not know he was the Son of God. Though, he continuously points out that they
may be exonerated from actual sin, due to ignorance, this does not mean they have the possibility of
salvation. Salvation is not granted based upon one’s ability to avoid sin. However, sin is an impediment
to obtaining salvation because it hinders one’s perseverance in charity.
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supply the rational case for why they understand they should. Instead, he would ask,
“What do you love?” In other words, what do you desire in your giving to that
organization? Recognition? The attention of a potential lover? God? Only then can we
have what Abelard is getting at. We have our why when we can locate the love that
prompted the performance of an action. The root of our actions is our love. We can have
holy desires or loves, which Abelard would describe (along with every other medieval
theologian) as caritas. Conversely, we can have unholy or carnal desires which he would
call, along with Augustine, cupiditas.
Still, we have not fully arrived at Abelard’s rather Augustinian notion of
intention. In addition to asking, “Why do you love?” we must also ask, “How purely do
you love it?” Abelard rightly recognizes that love comes in degrees. In the presence of
competing loves, one’s holy desire might be described as rather weak. In the absence of
competing loves, caritas may be described as pure, undefiled, or strong. Of course,
stronger love denotes pure intention: one loves God purely if she loves God and God
alone. The process of purifying intention, then, requires some letting go of other loves
and strengthening the only one that counts: love of God. Only then can we speak of
doing something for the glory of God or loving God in what we do; it affection, not
mere intellectual acknowledgement. It is on this basis we determine the merit of human
actions. They are good if they stem from caritas; merit depends on the object of our love.
Strictly speaking, people have caritas. Actions are charitable, in that they stem from
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caritas—that is, they are performed by a person who loves God in a rather pure way (as
opposed to a half-hearted, lukewarm way).
Now, finally, we are in position to compare Abelard’s account of moral praise
with Kant’s, returning to the two relevant features of Kant’s account of moral praise
outlined earlier. The Kantian Abelard presented by King and Porter should be seeming
increasingly suspect. First, does Abelard suggest in Scito te Ipsum that the passions are
morally neutral? When it comes to discerning what should and should not be
considered a sin, Abelard does seem to advocate something quite deontological:
consent to an unlawful act is sufficient for sin. However, when it comes to Abelard’s
assessment of moral praise this is clearly not the case; his criteria for blame and praise
are quite different. When it comes to assessing praiseworthiness, or merit, charity
renders moral agents righteous and praiseworthy before God. Abelard likens such
charity to spiritual desire—a movement of the soul towards God for the sake of himself.
Spiritual desires indicate the presence of good intention in acting. Conversely, bad
intentions in acting is motivated by carnal desires: wanting to be seen as pious, to
dominate, possess, or avenge, etc. On this account, evaluating the praiseworthiness of
lawful actions depends upon the intention, or inclination, motivating them. Because
desires—whether spiritual or carnal in nature—are key in evaluating the
praiseworthiness of the moral agent, Abelard’s criteria for moral praise are not only
different from Kant’s but entirely opposite. Whereas Kant puts forth an ethic based on
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pure philosophical reason, Abelard puts forth an ethic based on charity, affection for
God.
This first point helps demonstrate the second, namely, Abelard’s use of intentio is
not intellectual in nature. It does not correspond to a plan, a declaration of ends, or a
consent to what the conscience deems lawful. Because intentio is absolutely not a
present desire to perform an action—one consistent with what the conscience deems
lawful—as Peter King contends, Abelard does not regard the agent’s conceptualization
of his or her actions as praiseworthy. In other words, Abelard does not fashion a
“medieval categorical imperative.”70 If intention is read and understood as a plan to do
what one ought, a present desire to perform an action, or even as completely
synonymous with consent (an agreeableness of the will to perform an action), it is no
wonder that Abelard’s ethics has been deemed Kantian. For, on that basis, an agent
becomes praiseworthy because he has consented, after discerning what ought to be
done according to natural law, to perform a particular action. Using this outline,
interpreters have struggled to find a place for caritas—and they should because it does
not fit here. As a result, some have made the suggestion that love of God is reducible to
consenting to what one ought, even if it is difficult, making praiseworthiness of persons
dependent upon continence. “Abelard’s well-considered view then is that one should
show a willingness to follow the will of the order-giver in one’s moral consents or
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choices.”71 Theologically speaking, this reduces Abelard’s ethics to a sort of Christian
legalism. Charity is evidenced by a willingness to obey the lawgiver.
However, considering Abelard’s Commentary on Romans and the Collationes, this
interpretation simply does not fit. Our analysis thus far has made one thing clear:
actions in themselves are not praiseworthy. In order to asses praiseworthiness, Abelard
suggests you must examine the root of the action. In effect, having a willingness to obey
the lawgiver is only good if we qualify such a willingness substantially. Peter could be
willing to obey the lawgiver because he is afraid to be punished. Peter could be willing
to obey the lawgiver if he wants his friends to think well of him. A willingness to obey
the lawgiver is good only if it is rooted in charity. A fearful or prideful willingness is
not meritorious. Similarly, obedience for the sake of obedience is not praiseworthy
either. Christian obedience is always with the intention of love, while Kantian
obedience is motivated by duty.
In order to distance Abelard from the popular Kantian interpretation, it is worth
relishing this point: understanding that an action ought to be done and being pulled to
obedience through such obligation is very different than what Abelard suggests. Let us
consider this further. It could very well be the case that a man does “good” things his
whole life through the force of such Kantian obligation—his will conforms to the

Holopainen, Taina M. “Intentions and Conscious Moral Choices in Peter Abelard’s Know
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autonomous, rational choice each and every time. However, even a man of such
impeccable principle would be wholly insufficient by Abelard’s standard of moral
worth. For, it is not principle that makes a man, but his love. This is, in part, because the
only sort of merit with which Abelard is concerned is soteriological merit. In other
words, praiseworthiness is a consideration of whether or not an agent’s actions are
pleasing to God. Being that charity alone renders the Christian worthy of salvation,
charity alone is meritorious.
In this section, I have just outlined Abelard’s conception of moral blame and
praise. In doing so, I have shown that, according to Abelard, affective inclinations are
not morally neutral and that intention should not be taken to convey the rational
declaration of some end. Instead, what emerges given the re-reading I proffer, is an
ethical account that places clear emphasis on desire or affective inclinations. Abelard, in
other words, is not a proto-Kantian who dismisses the role of inclination in assessing
the moral praiseworthiness of agents. Instead, Abelard believes affective inclinations
are crucial in determining when a moral agent has acted well. This manifests in the
attention that Abelard gives to the theme of intention.
III.

Struggle and Merit
I have presented a rather bold claim above and in my previous chapters: Abelard

places a clear emphasis on affective inclinations and desire in determining the moral
praiseworthiness of agents. This can be seen through the centrality of intention in his
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ethical account. This may come as a surprise to many of Abelard’s interpreters, who
have claimed that there is a reoccurring link between merit and struggle against
desire—or the passions—in Abelard’s writing, most especially in Scito te Ipsum and his
letters to Heloise. They focus on passages such as the following from Scito te Ipsum:
So too nature itself or the constitution of the body makes man prone to
luxury just as it does to anger, yet they do not sin in this because that is how
they are, but through this they have the material for a struggle so that
triumphing over themselves through the virtue of temperance they may
obtain a crown (Sc. 4:4-7).72
Similarly, he writes to Heloise:
But what you suffer in your heart from the longing of the flesh, which
certainly is far greater for your youth, he left intact and kept you then in
readiness for your crown. I know it wearies you to hear it and you have told
me not to say it, but still the truth is plain—where there is struggle there is
also a crown: No one is crowned who does not strive.73
Again, in Historia Calamitatum:
The wise men among the pagans—the philosophers—were so named not
because of their knowledge but because of the character of their lives. To
gives examples of their sobriety and self-restraint would be teaching
wisdom to Minerva, but I will ask you this: if pagan and laymen could lead
“Sic et multos ad luxuriam sicut ad iram atura ipsa uel complexio corporis pronos efficit, nec
tamen in ipso hoc peccant quia tales sunt, sed pugnae materiam ex hoc habent ut per temperantiae
uirtutem de se ipsis triumphantes coronam percipiant.”
73 trans. William Levitan in Abelard & Heloise: The Letters and Other Writings. (Hackett, 2007). All
Translations of Historia Calamitatum and the canonical letter exchange between Abelard and Heloise will
follow this translation. Any modifications of Levitan’s translation will be indicated in subsequent
footnotes. When I include the Latin or modify the translations, I am using critical edition from J.T.
Muckle, “The Personal Letters Between Abelard and Heloise, “Medieval Studies 15 (1953), 47-94. This is
also what Levitan utilized for his own translation. This passage is from the Fourth Letter, 101. All page
numbers will be in reference to this text. The Latin reads: “refrigerauit ne corruam, multas adolescentiae
tuae maiores animi passiones ex assidua carnis suggestione reseruauit ad martyrii coronam. Quod licet te
audire taedeat et dici prohibeas, ueritas tamen id loquitur manifesta. Cui enim superest pugna, superest
et corona quia non coronabitur nisi qui legitime certauerit.”
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such lives as these while bound by no religious calling, what should you
do—you, a cleric and a canon—to hold your sacred duties above your
pleasure, to keep yourself plunging headlong into this Charybdis and
sinking irrevocably into sensuality and shame? If you care nothing for the
privilege of a cleric, if you hold God’s reverence in low esteem—if nothing
else, at least defend the dignity of a philosopher and control this
shamelessness with self-respect.74
Depending upon how one interprets these passages, they seem to challenge the
affective intentionalism I attribute to Abelard, as they may suggest a clear distrust of the
passions and reinforce the proto-Kantian reading of his ethics. Thus, it is my goal in this
section to consider such claims seriously and explain how Abelard’s language here is
not at odds with the affective intentionalism I argue for in this dissertation. In other
words, placing a clear importance upon struggling against certain passions in order to
obtain virtue does not amount to dismissing the importance of desire and affective
inclination all together, especially in the context of merit.
At first glance this struggle Abelard speaks of looks similar in nature to the
struggle against inclination that Kant expounds upon in the example of the cold-hearted
benefactor. The cold-hearted benefactor struggles against his preoccupation with his

Historia Calamitatum, 17. The full Latin passage is in reference to a claim Augustine makes
describing what a philosopher is/was: “Hoc itaque loco cum dicitur "qui modo quodam laudabilis uitae
aliis praestare uidebantur, etc." aperte monstratur sapientes gentium, id est philosophos, ex laude uitae
potius quam scientiae sic esse nominatos. Quam sobrie autem atque continenter ipsi uixerint, non est
nostrum modo ex exemplis colligere, ne Mineruam ipsam uidear docere. Si autem sic laici gentilesque
uixerint nulla scilicet professione religionis astricti, quid te clericum atque canonicum facere oportet, ne
diuinis officiis turpes praeferas uoluptates, ne te praecipitem haec Charybdis absorbeat, ne obcenitatibus
istis te impudenter atque irreuocabiliter immergas? Qui si clerici praerogatiuam non curas, philosophi
saltem defende dignitatem. Si reuerentia Dei contemnitur, amor saltem honestatis impudentiam
temperet. Memento Socratem uxoratum fuisse, et quam fedo casu hanc philosophiae labem ipse primo
luerit, ut deinceps caeteri exemplo eius cautiores efbcerentur.”
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own misfortune to do what is right—what is discerned through reason. Although he is
pulled by a contrary inclination, he, through strength of will, overcomes that pull and
acts dutifully. The cold-hearted benefactor, though having no inclination to give, gives
to the needy. In both the scenarios offered by Kant and by Abelard in the passages
above there is a clear struggle. However, these struggles are very different in kind. Let
me explain why.
First, Kant and Abelard are working with two entirely different schemas. Kant’s
primary concern is to show how inclinations or desires pose a threat to rationality.
Why? The passions “allow reflective formation of an immoral maxim.”75 This is a point
that is brought to the fore in feminist critiques of Kant. Lawrence Blum, for instance,
claims, that Kant is a “moral rationalist.” He defines the moral rationalist as defining
morality in terms of “self-control, strength of will, consistency, acting from universal
principles, adherence to duty and obligation.”76 He continues his characterization of the
moral rationalist claiming:
A further characteristic of rationalist moral philosophies' conception of the
good man is the absence of the following qualities of character: sympathy,

It is important to note that Kant does not use the word “emotion.” As many commentators
have pointed out, that is a creation of 19th century readings and the Romantic movement in general. For
instance, see: Hare, John, “Kant, the Passions, and the Structure of Moral Motivation,” in Faith, Rationality
and the Passions, ed. Sarah Coakley, (Wiley-Blackwell, 2012). Though there is not space to argue for how
Kant uses “desire,” “inclination,” “passion,” and “affect,” Hare provides a clear outline. He describes
Kantian desire as something that “can come and go” (140). When desires become settled habits of mind
they are referred to as inclinations. “When feelings are resistant to reason or reflection, Kant calls them
“affects.” When this resistance to reason is true of inclinations, he calls them “passions” (140).
76 Blum, Lawrence A. "Kant's and Hegel's Moral Rationalism: A Feminist Perspective." Canadian
Journal of Philosophy 12, no. 2 (1982): 287-302.
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compassion, kindness, caring for others, human concern, emotional
responsiveness. These qualities are much more closely bound up with
emotions and with the emotional aspect of human nature than are the
qualities associated with rationalism.77
So then, the Kantian schema is one in which rationality must overcome the influence

sentimentality has on our ethical decision making—the Kantian schema is one of
emotion verses reason. In order to merit moral praise, we must utilize a maxim
fashioned by pure reason. This is why Kant dares to claim that women are morally
inferior to men: their proclivity to sentimentality.78
On the contrary, this concern about emotion clouding reason, even the
juxtaposition between emotion and reason, is not central for Abelard. Instead, Abelard’s
schema is quite Pauline—it is about carnal verses spiritual desires and intentions, a
battle of wills. Carnal desire should not be understood as that which pertains to the
body, strictly speaking, but that which is contrary to holy desire. Under the umbrella of
“carnal” would be lust and gluttony but it also might include the desire for prestige, the
love of money, etc. In other words, this battle between the carnal and spiritual should
be understood within the Pauline and Augustinian framework: the concept of divided
will and disordered love that prevents the Christian from a flourishing relationship
with Christ. In other words, strong desire is not altogether bad. It is bad when it is not
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See: Marwah, Inder S. “What Nature Makes of Her: Kant’s Gendered Metaphysics.” Hypatia 28,
no. 3 (August 2013): 551–67. Marwah claims that, “women’s sub-ordinate status is internally connected to
Kant’s view of moral personhood.”
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properly ordered, when one loves something more than Christ. Therefore, strong carnal
desire is negative not because it clouds reason, per se, but because it weakens love of
God.79 In fact, when love of God is pure and primary the mind’s eye sees clearly.
Second, Kant and Abelard are utilizing different conceptions of will. For Kant,
will amounts to a faculty of choice; an exercise of will is an exercise of choice. Thus, the
word “will” in the Kantian usage is much closer to “consent” in Abelard’s usage.
However, in Abelard’s usage, will is not contrasted to feeling or desire; will is occurrent
desire, which includes feeling.80 This is why he continually speaks of acting contrary to
one’s own will. He says, for instance, “What else is it to bear the cross, to suffer some
crucifixion, but to act in a way against the will though it seems so easy or
advantageous?”81 Dying to self or taking up one’s cross means dying to selfish desire so
that one may follow the will of God. It presumes a multiplicity of wills and that some
wills or desires are congruent with God’s and others are not. Finally, it presumes that a
will is licit if and only if it is congruent with God’s. In this sense, one’s struggle against
his will or struggles against the flesh in order to walk according to the spirit. This does

In the Seventh Letter to Heloise, Abelard gives a detailed account of the religious rule for the
Paraclete. All of his instructions come back to this notion of purifying desire—intention—so that it is
single and for God alone. He continuously makes a distinction between doing good and doing well. To do
well, he says, is “to act with correct intention.” It involves loving God and extinguishing selfish desire in
our hearts.
80 This is Thomas Williams’s language. He defines Abelardian will in this way in “Will and
Intellect” Cambridge Companian to Medieval Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 2018), 243.
81 Seventh Letter, 173. “Aut quid est aliud crucem ferre, id est cruciatum aliquem sustinere, nisi
contra uoluntatem nostram aliquid fieri quantumcumque illud uideatur facile nobis esse uel utile?”
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not suggest that all emotion is contrary to acting with right reason, even though it can
be. Instead, it merely suggests that certain desires or wills may be contrary to God’s will
or command.
This concept of divided will makes it completely plausible for Abelard to speak
of suffering or struggle as opportunity for merit without compromising the importance
of affective inclinations in the assessment of persons or acts. Why? Because it is possible
that someone may have two occurrent wills—one carnal and one spiritual.
Furthermore, it is good and praiseworthy to forsake one’s will—desire—out of love for
God. This is Abelard’s point and the very reason he emphasizes intention while
maintaining that suffering can be meritorious. Forsaking will and want out of charity—
the movement of the soul towards God for the sake of himself—is praiseworthy. As far
as Abelard is concerned, anything done in charity is praiseworthy. So here we have it:
the Abelardian struggle is one between spiritual and carnal desire, love of God is the
praiseworthy motivational force. On the other hand, the Kantian struggle is between
reason and emotion, one acts well, or dutifully, when rationality beats out inclination in
the formation of ethical principle.
IV.

Moving Beyond the Kantian Appraisal
The spiritual and theological context of intentio yields a vastly different account

of Abelardian ethics. Though Abelard is most certainly philosophically driven and
implements the tools of logic to discern religious questions, his theological concerns
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about grace, spiritual affections, purity of heart are much more central to his ethical
account than previously acknowledged. When taken seriously, these theological
concerns render a nuanced Augustinian ethic, not a proto-Kantian one. This realization
is crucial in understanding both Abelard as a monastic figure in the Middle Ages and
his ethical project more specifically. Abelard’s ethics in not a prototype of the Early
Modern project. Moreover, it does not need to be paraded as one in order to merit
philosophical interest. Instead, he provides a robust philosophical account of sin and
salvific merit with the dialectical acumen of a logician, allowing him to elucidate rather
muddied concepts received from the Patristic tradition. Ultimately, the only prototype
of future philosophical movements that can be seen brewing in Abelard’s ethics is the
scholasticism of the High Middle Ages.
Now that it has been demonstrated that Abelard’s ethic not a proto-Kantian,
what is it really? If we are going to assess Abelard’s ethics using modern philosophical
categories and distinctions, we will find that his ethics does not fit perfectly into any of
them—virtue ethics, natural law, deontology, divine command, care ethics, or
consequentialism. In fact, with the exception of consequentialism, there are traces of
each of these in Abelard’s thought. Abelard talks incessantly of virtue but alludes to the
fact that charity alone is the only real virtue—one that cannot be practiced into reality.
He upholds a notion of natural law thought it is overwhelmingly clear that the natural
law alone is insufficient in determining the moral praiseworthiness of agents. He
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recognizes the importance of obedience to divine command but does not admit the
praiseworthiness of obedience without qualification. Meanwhile, he considers the role
of intention and affective inclination but also acknowledges that immense zeal can
sometimes cloud the mind’s eye and lead to illicit resolutions.
I suggest that we shouldn’t force Abelard’s ethics into any of these categories
previously mentioned. Instead, we should acknowledge it for what it is: an ethic of
charity. I believe this designation is particularly fitting because charity is, in fact, the
defining feature of Abelard’s ethic and the lens through which he understands and
evaluates human action. An ethic of charity has the following necessary conditions for
good actions. First, as far as Abelard is concerned, love of God necessarily includes
adherence to the natural law because it is born of the Holy Spirit. If someone truly
possess charity they will not be led in error—they will not be led to believe that
something contrary to the natural law is good. Ignorance may, in some cases, exonerate
an agent from blame, but it does not make a bad action good. Second, an act must be
consented to with charitable intentions, which presumes that the agent possess
charity—a movement of the soul towards God for the sake of himself. In other words,
an agent must love God for his actions to be considered good in a strict sense. This is
not a matter of constructing a principle consonant with charity and also differs from the
simple acknowledgment that God’s precepts and commands are good; it is knowing
and loving God in persona Christi. Thus, charity is sufficient to determine the moral
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quality of acts. Lastly, charity is also sufficient in assessing the moral quality of persons.
Someone is a good person because they are inclined by charity—they love in the
manner that God loves, see through the lens that God sees, understand through the
precepts God has set forth. In other words, someone is good because they become more
like Christ—vessels of selfless love.
This ethic of charity manifests perfectly in a sermon of Abelard’s written for the
Paraclete during Lent, entitled “On Almsgiving.”82 Abelard claims that charity itself, if
truly present in the heart of the Christian, produces an affection for the poor. In other
words, a Christian feels differently towards the poor. Throughout the sermon he
employs the metaphor of fire, which enflames the heart with love for the poor and
afflicted, and the metaphor of water, which hardens one’s heart to the needs of others.
Fire is the warmth brought into the Christian heart through charity. Water is the
absence of this warmth—a stagnant heart that has yet to be enflamed by the love of
God. Abelard’s exhortation is not to warn Christians that they have a duty to give to the
poor. Instead, he suggests that charity will change the way a Christian sees the poor. It
will move their heart to compassion and pity, which will prompt them to give. Seeing
the poor should make them feel something specific. He even argues that almsgiving has

It is worth noting that the sermons for the Paraclete were likely written after Abelard’s Scito te
Ipsum. “On Almsgiving” is the thirtieth sermon in a collection of thirty-five that were sent to the nuns at
the Paraclete. The original Latin title is De eleemosyna pro sanctimonialibus de Paraclito, “On Almsgiving for
the nuns of the Paraclete.” I have shorted the title to “On Almsgiving” for convenience.
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acquired the name “charity” because it is a practice of those who are most on fire for
God, saying, “Thus, because of this, almsgiving itself has been called by the special
name of “caritas,” meaning charity. On the contrary, hardheartedness toward the poor
displays a frigid mind (mens), utterly bereft of the fire of charity.”83 For Abelard, there is
no such thing as a cold-hearted, Christian benefactor—a Christian benefactor who is not
moved by the plight of the less fortunate. Ultimately, Abelard explains the importance
of almsgiving through underscoring the importance of Christian emotion. He argues
that compassion for the poor is a consequence of charity. Without it, he claims, our
minds and hearts are hardened, they refuse to hear the “cry of the poor” (clamore
pauperum). Charity inclines the heart towards the poor and increases affection for the
have-nots. Charity is the indelible mark of true Christian character.
He continues the sermon offering an argument as to why Christians should
practice almsgiving. He doesn’t make any sort of deontological claim. Instead, that
almsgiving is a good Christian practice for two reasons. First, he argues that giving to
the poor helps decrease inordinate desire and preoccupation with “unrighteous
mammon” that we have acquired and assumed to be our own. Through giving, he

Quotations from “On Almsgiving” are my own translations, which utilize the Latin from Petrus
Abaelardus opera, edd. Victor Cousin, adiuuante C. Jourdain et E. Despois. Tomus prior, Paris, 1849. This
was conveniently scanned to forumromanum.org. Because these translations are my own, I have included
the Latin from the critical edition here and for each subsequent quotation: “Unde et per excellentiam
quamdam ipsa eleemosynae largitas quasi proprio iam uel speciali nomine caritas uocari consueuit. Sic e
contrario obduratio mentis in pauperes maxime frigidam mentem esse conuincit, et ab omni caritatis igne
priuatam…”
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argues, we loosen the grip that such mammon (money, wealth) has in our lives and
make room for love of God to grow. He substantiates this claim by referencing Luke
11:41, in which Christ himself encourages almsgiving in order to cleanse the soul—to
decrease carnal desire.84 He later compares the Christian’s desire for money to Judas’s
betrayal of Christ.
Judas took unrighteous mammon as payment for betraying Christ; by
holding on to unrighteous mammon we ourselves are constantly killing
Christ. We accuse Judas for handing over Christ once in exchange for
money, but we do not accuse ourselves when our desire (cupiditatem) for
money nails him to the cross again and again. Brothers and sisters, let us
transform the mammon of iniquity into the mammon of equity and justice. 85
The desire to hold onto money that, Abelard argues, isn’t even ours in the first place, is
no different than Judas handing over Christ for thirty pieces of silver. One’s
preoccupation with money is a choice to love money over Christ and the poor whom he
loves. In effect, we exchange Jesus for money. His exhortation to give alms is
substantiated by calling to mind that it is a sort of spiritual exercise—one that shapes
desire by decreasing carnal love.
In addition, this is a point Abelard also emphasizes repeatedly in his Rule for the
community of nuns at the Paraclete:

Luke 12:41: “So give for alms those things that are within; and see, everything will be clean for
you” (NRSV).
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Suscepit Iudas mammonam iniquitatis, ut Christum traderet. Nos mammonam retinentes
iniquitatis, ipsum interficere non cessamus. Accusamus Iudam, quod eum propter pecuniam semel
tradidit. Non accusamus nos, quod per pecuniae cupiditatem eum quotidie quasi iterum crucifigentes
interficimus. Transferamus, fratres, istam mammonam iniquitatis in mammonam aequitatis atque
iustitiae.
84
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But when we renounce our possessions and ourselves, then truly is our
property cast aside and truly do we enter in the life of the apostles, in which
all things were held in common […]All things were for the common good
and no one sought what was his own but only what was Christ’s. There was
no other way they could live without property, which consists more of
desires than possessions.86
Here Abelard explains monastic vow of poverty in terms of desire. The reason for
giving up possessions is so that they do not preoccupy the mind and divert one’s
attention from Christ. All aspects of the monastic life, in fact, are traced back to this
purpose: to increase the purity of devotion and prayer. In other words, to increase
charity.
Abelard’s second point in justifying the practice of almsgiving is that it is
sacramental—it makes God’s love visible. Through giving to the poor the Christian
increases knowledge and awareness of God’s love. “Clearly, as your charity to the poor
is extended, the Lord is not only made known to you, but is made known to others
through your example,” he preaches to the nuns of the Paraclete.87 Why? It is because of
that love (God’s love for them) that they are moved to give—charity or giving alms is
understood as a unique Christian call. In effect, good deeds take on this evangelical

Seventh Letter, 173. The Latin reads: “Cum uero ita tam rebus nostris quam nobis ipsis penitus
renuntiamus, tunc uere omni proprietate abiecta uitam illam apostolicam inimus, quae omnia in
commune reducit […]Alioquin nequaquam sine proprietate uiueretur, quae magis in ambitione quam in
possessione consistit.
87 Ut uestra uidelicet caritas pauperibus impensa, non solum uos Dominus lucretur, sed exemplo
uestro alios ei acquirat.
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spirit, allowing others outside the faith to be drawn to the Kingdom of God through an
encounter with love.
Abelard’s justifications for almsgiving both come back to charity. The importance
of good deeds, almsgiving being one of them, is justified through explaining how they
increase love on an individual and communal level. Giving extinguishes greed or
inordinate desire through letting go of our possessions and our preoccupation with
them and it also allows others to have an experience of charity that awakens them to the
reality of God’s love. In addition, Abelard also explains the cause of giving to be rooted
in charity. He insists that charity makes almsgiving possible. When Abelard suggests
that charity warms the heart and mind, it is obvious that he implies charity causes
Christians to feel something for the poor—to be moved by their suffering and poverty.
This is a stark contrast to the Kantian proposal. One might even describe Kant’s “coldhearted benefactor” as a foil to the portrait of Christian love that Abelard paints in his
sermon. In it, he maintains that Christian love is not merely performing loving actions
nor is it doing loving actions because they are the right thing to do. Instead, charity
changes the way the Christian sees the poor. Charity “warms the heart” and enflames
affection for those whom God loves. Through charity the Christian sees the poor in the
same manner that Christ would see them. This recognition procures affection, an
affection that is impossible without the grace of charity. As a result, this sermon
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perfectly demonstrates that Abelard’s ethic really is an ethic of charity. All things that
pertain to the good, Christian life are unquestionably rooted in this love.

V.

Conclusions
I believe it is clear through what I have presented that the Kantian appraisal of

Abelard is misguided and forced. Due to the conflation of intention and consent
procured by a modern bias in understanding intent, different usages and notions of
“will,” and an improper construal of struggle through failure to couch struggle within
the context of a divided will, Abelard’s ethics has been lost in translation. Truly, the
theological foundation of his ethics has been cast aside in exchange for a modern
schema of reason against emotion—a concern that is not truly present in the text.
While Abelard’s suggestions are not particularly novel, they are lost when a
Kantian ethical framework is ascribed to him. The Kantian suggestion of a practical
Christian love is rather bourgeois—the very passion-less, duty- centered Christianity
that Soren Kierkegaard so rightly despised. This is not the sort of Christianity Abelard
endorses. However, if we take King and Porter’s interpretations of his ethics, that is
exactly where they lead: to a reading that is largely incongruent with his theological
commitments.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
SOLA CARITATE

So far, I have come close to providing a full account of Abelard’s ethical theory.
In Chapter 1, I discussed the Augustinian foundation and context for Abelard’s
understanding of intention and demonstrated that intention is a central theme present
in his interpretation of the Gospel. In Chapter 2, I carefully distinguished between
intention and consent and exposed some possible sources for the history of conflating
the two terms in the secondary literature. In Chapter 3, I showed that Abelard is not a
proto-Kantian and suggested that he does not fit neatly into any contemporary ethical
categories. As a result, I claimed we might best understand Abelard as prescribing an
“ethic of charity,” caritas. Although the reading I have provided so far demonstrates
what makes a person and their actions praiseworthy—caritas—there is still some
question as to how one obtains charity and cultivates it in order to become all that
Abelard suggests the Christian can be. It will be the goal of this final chapter to explain
this mystery, only to the extent that Abelard is able. In answering this question, it will
become increasingly clear that the ethical life and the spiritual life are indistinguishable,
as the answer depends upon the Incarnation and atonement. As a result, though
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Abelard tries to find a place for virtuous pagans, he is unable to do so successfully,
while also maintaining that charity is sufficient for virtue and salvation.
The present chapter, which will complete this nuanced account of Abelard’s
ethics, will be divided into two parts. First, I would like to utilize the nuanced account
of Abelard’s atonement clearly outlined by Thomas Williams and Phillip Quinn. Using
and expanding upon the work they have already done, I will clearly situate Abelard’s
ethics within his theory of atonement. One participates in Christ’s atoning work (the
objective sacrifice of Christ available to all people) through being joined to Christ in
charity, in love. This depends upon the subjective response and transformation of the
Christian. In other words, I argue that Abelard’s emphasis on intention in his ethics fits
within a larger theological narrative, one about the Christian’s transformation in Christ
and how that transformation occurs. Christ turns out to be the climax of this salvific
narrative because his life, passion, death, and resurrection make possible the
sanctification of intention—the gift of the Incarnation engenders a response of charity.
In the second half of this chapter, I will consider how this narrative creates an especially
difficult dilemma for pagan virtue, since Abelard believes virtue is predicated upon
knowing and loving Christ.
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I.

Abelard’s Theory of Atonement
Abelard’s theory of atonement has a long history of misinterpretation. In most

standard Christian theology anthologies Abelard is accused of being an advocate and
inventor of the moral exemplar theory of atonement—Christ came to be an example of
holiness and through following his example we can merit salvation through working
out our sanctification.88 This unorthodox account is normally highlighted as a contrast
to orthodox explanations of Christ’s saving work, such as Anselm’s satisfaction theory
or Luther’s penal substitution theory.89 The dissatisfaction with Abelard’s apparent
moral exemplarism is that it refuses some objective transaction, in which Christ’s saving
work accomplishes salvation on behalf of sinners. Richard Swinburne, for instance,
emphatically dismisses Abelard’s account in Responsibility and Atonement because
“Abelard's exemplary theory of the atonement, that Christ's life and death work to

Rashdall Hastings posits this notion in The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology (Macmillian,
1919), 360. Gustaf Aulén suggests something similar in Christus Victor, (Wipf & Stock, 1931), 96: “He was,
indeed, so far in accord with the mindset of the period that all his thought lay on the moralistic level.” It
is worth noting that this caricature of his theory of atonement was likely popularized by Bernard of
Clairvaux. For instance, Bernard claims, “This is the righteousness of man in the blood of the Redeemer:
which this son of perdition, by his scoffs and insinuations, is attempting to render vain; so much so, that
he thinks and argues that the whole fact that the Lord of Glory emptied Himself, that He was made lower
than the angels, that He was born of a woman, that He lived in the world, that He made trial of our
infirmities, that He suffered indignities, that at last He returned to His own place by the way of the Cross,
that all this is to be reduced to one reason alone, viz., that it was done merely that He might give man by
His life and teaching a rule of life, and by His suffering and death might set before him a goal of charity.
Did He, then, teach righteousness and not bestow it? Did He show charity and not infuse it, and did He
so return to His heaven?” in Letter LX, “Against Certain Heads of Abelard’s Heresies,” in The Complete
Works of S. Bernard, Abbot of Clairvaux, trans. Joannes Mabillon, (John Hodges, 1904).
89 It is worth noting that some, such as Gustaf Aulen, claim that Luther’s atonement theory is
more akin to a “classic” view of atonement. He argues that Luther prescribes a Chritus Victor model of
atonement, where Christ defeats death and sin through his passion death, and, resurrection.
Consequently, we can share in that victory through faith.
88
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remove our sins by inspiring us to penitence and good acts, contains no objective
transaction.”90
However, in recent years the secondary scholarship has tackled this mistake.
Thomas Williams explains in the Cambridge Companion to Abelard that Abelard’s
atonement theory does not refuse acknowledgement of an objective transaction: “The
exemplarist reading denies any such objective benefit and therefore misses a key aspect
of Abelard’s theory of the Atonement.”91 Likewise, Phillip Quinn describes Abelard as a
hierarchical pluralist—his atonement theory has a number of moving parts, one of them
being penal substitution; however, the dominant motif is exemplarism. In other words,
simply because Abelard could be described as exemplarist, that does not exclude the
use and implementation of additional metaphors and motifs in his atonement theory. I
agree with Quinn and Williams that Abelard is not a pure exemplarist—there are
objective and subjective elements present in Abelard’s atonement theory. The
remainder of this section will detail what, exactly, those objective and subjective
elements are and how they are relevant to Abelard’s ethics by looking at Scito te Ipsum
and Abelard’s Romans Commentary.

Swinburne, Richard. Responsibility and Atonement (Clarendon Press, 1989), 162.
Williams, Thomas. “Sin, Grace, and Redemption,” in Cambridge Companion to Abelard.
(Cambridge University Press, 2004), 259.
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As Williams describes, according to Abelard humans need a redeemer because
they are under the dominion of sin.92 There is an objective aspect of this dominion and a
subjective aspect of this dominion. First, let us review the objective dominion, which is a
direct result of original sin. Though Abelard’s view on original sin deviates from the
norm, he does hold that all human beings incur punishment as a result of original sin—
the sin of Adam. He proposes that “Properly, as we observed above, sin is said to be
that contempt of God or consent to evil from which little children and the naturally
foolish are immune” (Sc. 56: 22-23).93 In other words, sin in the strict sense cannot be
said of everyone. He takes this view because, as he demonstrates in Scito te Ipsum,
consent is needed for sin and consent requires reason. Therefore, humans without the
ability to consent (those who lack the power of reason) are unable to sin. However, sin
can also be discussed in terms of penalty. Abelard contends that when we speak of
“original sin” we speak of sin in terms of penalty. He claims, “But when we say that
little ones have original sin or that all of us, as the Apostle says, have sinned in Adam,
the effect is as if to say that by his sin we have incurred the beginning of our
punishment or the sentence of damnation” (Sc. 56: 30-32).94 From this we gather that

Williams, Thomas, “Sin, Grace, and Redemption,” 265-269.
All of the translations from Scito te Ipsum are taken from Luscombe (Oxford, 1971). Luscombe
also provides a Latin critical edition of the text in the same publication.
94 Abelard discusses this point in the Romans Commentary as well. See Book II in a Quaestio on sin
following his exposition of Romans 5:14: “Since, therefore, we say that men are begotten and born with
original sin and also contract this same original sin from the first parent, it seems that this should refer
more to the punishment of sin, for which, of course, they are held liable to punishment, than to the fault
of the soul and the contempt for God. For the one who cannot yet use free choice nor yet has any exercise
92
93
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human beings are not born sinful, per se; they are born bearing the punishment for the
first sin of Adam. So the objective dominion of sin is the punishment we incur through
the first sin of Adam.
Now what about the subjective dominion? As Williams explains, concupiscence
is the subjective dominion of sin Abelard describes in the Romans Commentary.95 Abelard
understands concupiscence in the typical Augustinian way: disordered love. Human
beings love the wrong things too much and the right things too little. This inordinate
love results in turmoil—we know what is right but for some reason do not want it as we
should. Thus, a lot of time is spent chasing after things that ultimately lead to our
degradation. In other words, we are subject to the power of our own rogue desire,
enslaved to ourselves.
So far we have gathered, with the help of Williams’s exposition of the Romans
Commentary, that there is a objective and subjective dominion of sin in Abelard’s theory
of atonement. This means that there also must be an objective and subjective
redemption from sin, which is precisely what we find Abelard describing. The objective
redemption is the notion that Christ died for the remission of sin—to remove the
punishment for sin, which is damnation. This is accomplished through the Passion—the

of reason, as though he recognizes the author or deserves the precept of obedience, no transgression, no
negligence should be imputed to him, nor any merit at all by which he might be worthy of reward or
punishment, more than to those beasts, when they seem either to do harm or to help in something.”
95 Williams, Thomas, “Sin, Grace, and Redemption,” 267-269.
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suffering and death of Christ on the cross. The subjective redemption depends upon an
individual’s transformation in Christ. If the subjective dominion of sin suggests that
people are enslaved by inordinate loves, then the subjective redemption of sin denotes a
release from these inordinate loves. When someone is released from the subjective
dominion of sin, she can love what she ought. This is precisely what the subjective
transformation entails, coming to love Christ and letting go of other loves that are
impediments to relation with him. This does not mean that one will never struggle
against carnal desire. Instead, it means that the love of Christ allows one to conquer
those desires.
II.

Justified by Love
Now there are two questions that we might consider that help make more sense

of this atonement theory. First, how is Christ’s expiation for sin transferred to particular
people? Second, why was it necessary for God to become man to accomplish all this—to
atone for the punishment of original sin and to remove the dominion of concupiscence?
Why couldn’t one final, really awesome goat suffice? First, let us consider the matter of
transference. How does a particular person gain access to the merits of Christ’s
sacrifice? Martin Luther has one possible answer: one is justified or made right with
God by virtue of one’s faith. 96 One gains the merits of Christ through accepting Jesus as

Martin Luther indicates this pretty explicitly in “On Christian Liberty,” trans. Henry Wace and
C. A. Buchheim, in First Principles of the Reformation (John Murray, 1883), 108: “But you ask how it can be
the fact that faith alone justifies, and affords without works so great a treasure of good things, when so
96
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one’s personal Lord and savior. Another possible answer is the prevailing Roman
Catholic sentiment of the Middle Ages: the sacraments. In baptism one is justified;
through reception of the Eucharist one is joined to the sacrifice of Christ; in
confirmation one receives the gifts of the Holy Spirit; in confession the grace of God’s
mercy, etc.
Though Abelard would not deny the importance of faith and the sacraments, he
considers neither to be sufficient for transference of Christ’s merits. As he sees it, faith is
a feature common to the saved and the reprobate:
But he imparts this grace equally to the reprobate and the elect by
instructing each one equally about this, so that by the same grace of faith
which they obtained, one is aroused to good works, and the other is
rendered inexcusable through the negligence of his sluggishness.
Therefore, this faith, which works in the first through love, and is of no
effect, inactive, unfruitful, and inoperative in the other one, is the grace of
God, which goes before each of the elect, so that he may begin to desire
well; and again it follows the beginning of a good will, so that that will may
persevere. (Comm. Rom. IV.9:21, 298-9).97

many works, ceremonies, and laws are prescribed to us in the Scriptures. I answer: before all things bear
in mind what I have said, that faith alone without works justifies, sets free, and saves, as I shall show
more clearly below.”
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All of my quotes from the Romans Commentary follow Stephen Cartwright, (Catholic
University Press, 2012). If amendments to his translations are made, I will indicate this in the footnotes. I
will utilize, as Cartwright has done, the Latin critical edition provided by E.M. Buytaert, CCCM 11
(Turnhout, 1969). Latin for this passage is: Hanc autem gratiam tam reprobis ipse quam electis pariter
impertit, utrosque scilicet ad hoc aequaliter instruendo, ut ex eadem fidei gratia quam perceperunt, alius
ad bona opera incitetur, alius per torporis sui negligentiam inexcusabilis reddatur. Haec itaque fides quae
in isto per dilectionem operatur, in illo inens et segms atque otiosa uacat, gratia Dei est quae
unumquemque electum praeuenit, ut bene uelle incipiat, ac rursus bonae uoluntatis exordium
subsequitur, ut uoluntas ipsa perseueret.
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In other words, there seem to be a lot of Christians who claim to believe and accept
Christ but have no corresponding transformation—they lay claim to the objective
redemption but are still walking according to the flesh. The same seems to be the case
with the sacraments. Many get baptized and show no signs of personal transformation.
Abelard is clear that the sacraments themselves are not sufficient for salvation; someone
can be deemed righteous even without the sacrament of baptism.
For if someone already believes and loves before he is baptized—just like
Abraham, concerning whom it is written, “Abraham believed God, and it
was counted to him as righteousness,” and perhaps Cornelius, whose
merciful acts were accepted by God when he had not yet been baptized—
and truly repents of his previous sins, just like the tax collector who went
down from the temple justified—I do not hesitate to say that he is righteous
or has righteousness (iustitia), which renders to each person what is his.
(Comm Rom. II.3.27, 170).98
In one breath Abelard identifies three examples of men who have “righteousness”
without the sacrament of baptism. He considers each of these cases to be instances in
which the person already believes and has love. This notion—that love, charity, can
provide clear exceptions to the rules—also manifests in his treatment of confession in
Scito te Ipsum:
With this sigh and contrition of heart which we call true repentance sin does
not remain, that is, the contempt of God or consent to evil, because the
charity of God which inspires this sigh does not put up with fault. In this
sigh we are instantly reconciled to God and we gain pardon […] For
“Nam et antequam aliquis baptizaretur, si iam credit et diligit, sicut Abraham de quo scriptum
est: Credidit Abraham Deo et reputatum est ei ad iustitiam et fortasse Cornelius nondum baptizatus
cuius eleemosynae susceptae sunt a Deo, et de praeteritis peccatis uere poenitet sicut publicanus qui de
templo descendit iustificatus. Eum iustum non dubito seu iustitiam habere qui unicuique reddit quod
suum est.”
98
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although he may be prevented by some necessity from having an
opportunity of coming to confession or of performing satisfaction, he by no
means meets hell on leaving this life sighing thus. (Sc. 88: 5-22)99
True repentance is born of charity; it is the sigh or groan of an offense against God
because he is loved. As a result, true contrition is unfathomable without love as its
source. If Peter dies and is prevented from going to confession beforehand, this does not
necessarily mean he ceases to be forgiven for his sins. This is because, as Abelard
contends, reconciliation is the consequence of love, not the consequence of a
technicality.100
In order to make sense of this, let us consider the alternative. Peter can be truly
sorry he has sinned because he does not want the punishment for sin. He could go to
confession, confess his sins, and technically be absolved. However, if Peter does so
because he simply he fears punishment, it is not counted to him as righteousness—it
does not reconcile him to God. Putting all of this together, there is one sufficient
condition for salvation: love, charity. While faith is logically prior to love, it is not
sufficient for salvation. While the sacraments are important in maintaining love, they

“Cum hoc autem gemitu et contrition cordis, quam uerum penitentiam dicimus, paccatum non
permanent, hoc est, contemptus Dei siue consensus in malum, quia karitas Dei hunc gemitum inspirans
non patitur culpam. In hoc statim gemitu Deo reconciliamur et precedentis paccati ueniam assequimur
[…] Et si enim articulo necessitates preuentus non habeat locum ueniendi ad confessionem uel peragendi
saisfactionem, nequaquam in hoc gemitu de hac uita recedens gehennam incurrit…”
100 See: Lucas Briola argues this point in "A case study of scholasticism: Peter Abelard and Peter
Lombard on penance." Journal Of Moral Theology 5, no. 1 (January 2016): 65-85 and Susan Kramer does as
well in “We speak to God with Our Thoughts: Abelard and the Implications of Private Communication
with God,” Church History 69, no. 1 (March 2000): 18-40.
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are not sufficient for salvation. Strictly speaking, the Christian is not saved by faith or
the sacraments, but love.101 This is how the merits of Christ are transferred to particular
people—charity.102
And if we diligently pay attention, nothing transitory is worthy of the
reward of eternal good. For only charity, which never passes away, merits
eternal life; and those who are equal in charity are held as equals before
God in reward, even if another is deprived of the operation of charity,
entangled by some failure. Therefore, blessed Augustine rightly claims that
John, who did not suffer, has a crown of martyrdom equal to that which
Peter has, who did suffer, so that God may consider not so much the effect
of the suffering as the inner disposition. (Comm Rom. III.8.18, 275)103

It is worth pointing out that Abelard’s suggestion is consonant with scripture, probably the
most well-known passage in the Pauline epistles, the Ode to Love. I included part the passage, 1 Cor. 13:
1-13, for comparison: “If I speak in the tongues of mortals and of angels, but do not have love, I am a
noisy gong or a clanging cymbal. And if I have prophetic powers, and understand all mysteries and all
knowledge, and if I have all faith, so as to remove mountains, but do not have love, I am nothing. If I give
away all my possessions, and if I hand over my body so that I may boast, but do not have love, I gain
nothing. Love is patient; love is kind; love is not envious or boastful or arrogant or rude. It does not insist
on its own way; it is not irritable or resentful; it does not rejoice in wrongdoing, but rejoices in the truth. It
bears all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things. Love never ends. But as for
prophecies, they will come to an end; as for tongues, they will cease; as for knowledge, it will come to an
end. For we know only in part, and we prophesy only in part; but when the complete comes, the partial
will come to an end. When I was a child, I spoke like a child, I thought like a child, I reasoned like a child;
when I became an adult, I put an end to childish ways. For now we see in a mirror, dimly, but then we
will see face to face. Now I know only in part; then I will know fully, even as I have been fully
known. And now faith, hope, and love abide, these three; and the greatest of these is love.”
102 It is worth noting that although charity is sufficient, Abelard by no means suggests that the
sacraments are unimportant. In addition, he suggests that faith is necessary for love because one cannot
love without knowing God. This requires belief. Abelard is seeking to answer the question in terms of
necessity. If one could be saved without x, then x is not a necessary condition for salvation.
103 Et si diligenter attendamus, nihil transitorium aeterni boni remuneratione dignum est. Sola
quippe caritas, quae numquam excidit, uitam promeretur aeternam; et quicumque aequales sunt caritate,
pares apud Deum habentur remuneratione, etiamsi alter effectu caritatis priuetur aliquo casu
praepeditus. Unde et merito beatus Augustinus aequalem de martyrio coronam asserit habere Iohannem
qui passus non est, quam et Petrus habet qui passus est, ut non tam passionis effectum quam affectum
Deus attendat.
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Abelard’s answer has obvious benefits over the faith-based theory of transference or a
sacramental theory of transference. As I already suggested, in the case of faith and the
sacraments there is a seeming disconnect between the objective and subjective.
Redemption in the objective domain does not denote redemption in the subjective
domain. Peter could claim faith in the Gospel and still act nothing like Jesus. Peter could
participate in sacramental life and still look nothing like Jesus. This disconnect between
the objective and subjective redemption of sin makes salvation technical—it consists of
believing the right things or performing certain religious rituals. As a result, soteriology
and morality become distinct discussions. In other words, one can be saved without
also being transformed.104
Abelard avoids these pitfalls by locating charity as the medium of transference.
Charity is the effective means through which the merits of Christ are transferred to
particular people and the means of subjective transformation. In other words, love is the
agent of objective and subjective redemption—it removes the punishment of sin and the
subjective dominion of sin, concupiscence. As a result, it is impossible to speak of
removing the punishment for sin without also speaking of the subjective transformation
of a particular person. In Abelard’s theory of atonement we see a complete synthesis of
the soteriological and the moral. Moreover, redemption and transformation of

This notion of transformation accompanying redemption is a Pauline theme in his epistle to
the Romans 12:2, “And do not be conformed to this world, but be transformed by the renewing of your
mind, so that you may prove what the will of God is, that which is good and acceptable and perfect.”
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particular people both depend upon the paschal mystery—Christ’s passion, death, and
resurrection.
This is the perfect point to consider the second question I proposed as being
worthy of consideration: Why did Christ need to become a person to enable this entire
process? How come one final, really awesome goat could not suffice and accomplish the
same effects? The answer requires taking a look at moral psychology. As Phillip Quinn
suggests, Abelard’s theory of atonement provides a keen awareness of how human
beings work. 105 This is useful in understanding the why of the Incarnation and its
relation to the theory of atonement Abelard puts forth. In what follows, I would like to
expound upon that notion—that Abelard’s theory provides keen awareness of how
human beings work—by focusing on the role of moral exemplars in creating virtue and
what kind of exemplars are effective in achieving that end.
First, I will begin with Jennifer Herdt’s explanation of the connection between
virtue and moral exemplars in Aristotle, which has significant insights that will be
helpful in understanding the subjective elements of Abelard’s theory of atonement. I am
not suggesting that Abelard is inspired to create an atonement theory based upon

Quinn discusses this in “Abelard on Atonement” in Reasoned Faith, 209: “It seems that one of
the advantages of the Abelardian emphasis on love in giving an account of the Atonement is precisely
that is provides a model of psychological transformation rooted in ordinary human experience that can
be analogically extended to divine action. Many of us have actually experienced the power of human love
influence our characters for the better by provoking a response of love, and some of us have experienced
the power of human love, and some of us have experienced the power of meditation on the example of
love displayed in the life and death of Christ to contribute to bringing about such psychological
improvements in us.”
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Aristotelian moral psychology. I am merely pointing out that Herdt’s explanation can
help defend an otherwise curious emphasis on the exemplarism of Christ and the
corresponding subjective emphasis Abelard places on his atoning work. Herdt claims:
What is crucial in order for one’s desires to be transformed into those of a
virtuous person (such that one performs the actions characteristic of a
virtuous person but does so with the accompanying enjoyment in doing the
right things for the right reasons and in the right ways) is that one love and
be loved by the moral exemplar set before one.106
She continues:
Moreover, forced compliance alone cannot give rise to more than
continence; it might over time relieve the pain of unfamiliarity and yield
mechanical conformity, but not a positive enjoyment.107
Herdt’s central claim contains two suggestions. First, a student of virtue must love their
teacher—their exemplar. Second, a student of virtue must be loved by their teacher—
their exemplar. If one of these pieces is missing, then the student will fail to cultivate the
intrinsic motivation necessary for virtue—she won’t do what is right for the right
reasons and enjoy doing so. In pointing this out, Herdt underscores the fact that love is
the bedrock for virtue. It is important to distinguish love and admiration, for love
occurs only in the context of relationship. Without it, she insists, the student of virtue
can accomplish nothing more than continence or forced compliance. By definition,

Herdt, Jennifer. Putting on Virtue: The Legacy of Splendid Vice. (University of Chicago Press,
2008), 28-9.
107 Ibid
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forced compliance does not leave room for the possibility that one enjoys the good. In
effect, forced compliance inherently falls short of the criteria for virtue.
If we explore the notion of Christ as moral exemplar, he fits the bill in both of
these significant ways. He is not merely a person we point to as worthy of imitation,
like a saint or a winner of the Nobel Peace Prize. Quinn makes a similar point: “The love
of God for us exhibited in the life of Christ is a good example to imitate, but it is not
merely an example.”108 Instead, the act of suffering and dying for us makes clear that we
are loved by him and provides an open invitation for relationship. As Abelard so often
recalls in the Romans Commentary, Christ demonstrates his supreme love for all people
through the willingness to suffer and die for us. Abelard is keen on quoting John 15:13
in substantiating this point:
Concerning his ineffable charity surrounding us, he elsewhere says, But God
commends his charity towards us in that while we were still sinners, Christ died
for us. Likewise again, He did not spare his own Son, but handed him over for us
all. And the Son says through himself, “No one has greater love than this,
that he [should lay down] his own life,” etc. (Comm. Rom. III. 7:6, 247-8)109
The Gospel message—that God loves us—is communicated uniquely through the
expression of sacrifice, an expression made possible through the Incarnation. If God did
not become a man, he could not suffer and die as a man. Though this point is obvious, it

Quinn, “Abelard on Atonement,” 296.
The Latin is: “De cuius quidem circa nos ineffabili caritate alibi dicit: Commendat autem suam
caritatem Deus in nobis quoniam si cum adhuc peccatores essemus, Christus pro nobis mortuus est. Item
rursum: Proprio Filio suo non pepercit, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum. Et per semetipsum Filius
ait: Maiorem hac dilectionem nemo habet ut animam suam... etc.”
108
109
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is an important one. This communication of love would be impossible if God himself
were not the sacrifice, which is precisely why a really awesome goat will not do.
Indeed, this is necessary in rousing us to our perfection in charity:
And this is what he says: that the perfect charity for God and neighbor IN
US, which the law teaches, justifies us. For that greatest kindness, which
he showed to us, compels [us] truly to love Christ in the same way as God,
in the same way as our neighbor. This [kindness] is the condemnation of
sin in us, that is, the destruction of all guilt and defect through charity,
generated in us by this greatest kindness. (Comm. Rom. III.8:4, 206)110
In other words, God’s love entails more than simply not punishing us. He loves us to
the point of willing and providing the means necessary to actualize our supernatural
perfection: the very gift of himself.
Moreover, this loving sacrifice of Christ transcends the limitations of human love
because it is extended universally. What I mean by this is that Christ does not designate
this sacrifice for one person in the way that I would be sacrificing my life for one person
if I jumped in front of a bullet that was supposed to kill them. By virtue of his
omniscience, Christ knows each of us and died for each of us. In this way, the love he
extends is open to all willing to reciprocate it; it is truly catholic. These stipulations for
good mentorship that Herdt identifies become open to all. This solves the elitist
difficulty that we are unable to explain away in Aristotle: only some privileged people

The Latin is: Et hoc est quod ait ut caritas Dei et proximi, quam lex praecipit. IN NOBIS
perfecta nos iustificaret. Ipsum quippe Christum tamquam Deum, ipsum tamquam proximum uere
diligere summum illud baneficium, quod nobis exhibuit, compellit. Quod est in nobis peccatum damnare,
id est reatum omnem et culpam destruere per caritatem, ex hoc summo beneficio in nobis propagatam.
110
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have access to virtue because of their aristocracy, their location, their gender, their
intellectual aptitude and luck in finding a suitable mentor. It must be practiced,
habituated, and inspired through intense schooling and study. Abelard’s exemplarism
challenges this notion. The scope, power, and influence of the Gospel (and its capacity
to inspire this response of love) are only limited by the authenticity and evangelizing
power of the church. This reveals both the awesome agent and painful hindrance
Christianity has the potential to be.
By considering both the objective and subjective dimensions of sin’s dominion
simultaneously we can arrive at a compelling account of the Incarnation—humans
needed an extraordinary witness of love to rise above subjective dominion of sin. This is
a crucial point for Abelard. In Christ, one gets more than an exemplary figure worthy of
admiration, but a perfect specimen who loves each of us personally, enough to suffer
and die so we could know love. In other words, Christ is an objectively good exemplar
who has made a personal investment in each of us. Through consideration of moral
psychology and the force of moral exemplarism in the context of relationship we can
arrive at an explanation of the Incarnation and atonement that relies on charity: God
was willing to endure a mortal death to show all people how deeply he loves and so
that we may come to love the same. Again, such a love transcends the remission of
punishment but wills the flourishing, the perfection, of humanity and provides the
means to actualize it. Relying solely on the objective dimension of the atonement as
112

recourse for explanation makes it difficult to rationalize the brutality of satisfaction and
why God himself needed to be that satisfaction for sin. All answers point to justice,
punishment, and are couched in legalistic terms. Explanations for how Christ’s merits
are transferred to individuals follow suit. However, doing away with it completely
removes the force of Christ’s demonstration of love and exemplarism. So the subjective
dimension of Abelard’s atonement theory relies upon the objective transaction—
without it, the supreme example of love is mere suffering for suffering’s sake.
I have shown that Abelard’s ethics and his theory of atonement are interdependent and cannot be considered without the other. Charity is the effective medium
through which we receive the merits of Christ and begin the subjective transformation
of our person. Through charity, love of God for his own sake, the Christian sanctifies
intention, which is the foundation of salvific merit. Abelard does not suggest that there
can be such a thing as a “good action” that ceases to have charity at its core. As a result,
becoming truly virtuous and obtaining salvation are the very same thing—both depend
upon knowing the person of Christ and coming to love him, for it is only the force of his
extraordinary example, his inspiring love, that virtue is possible. As we will see next,
this makes the possibility of virtuous pagans a rather difficult theological conundrum.
III. Pagan Virtue
As John Marenbon notes in Pagans and Philosophers: The Problem of Paganism from
Augustine to Leibniz, pagans presented a genuine difficulty for philosophers throughout
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the Middle Ages—the veracity of pagan knowledge, the possibility of pagan salvation,
and the authenticity of pagan virtue.111 Abelard is infamous for his struggle with all of
the above. As the account of Abelard’s ethics I have provided makes apparent, Abelard
places charity at the center of the good life and salvation—true virtue and salvific merit
depend entirely upon it. Because Abelard defines charity, along with Augustine, as
“loving someone for his own sake,” it requires explicit knowledge of who God is. 112
One cannot love something that one does not know. As a result, Abelard has to admit
either the possibility of charity without explicit knowledge of the Incarnation or the
possibility of virtue without charity. There does not appear to be clear textual support
for either of these options. Instead, we uncover a messy attempt to create a space for
both pagan virtue and salvation that do not exactly fit within the narrative he offers in
the Romans Commentary.
There are a few central concerns driving this messy, egalitarian attempt. First,
Abelard is committed to the idea that works only gain merit by virtue of their intention.
This is how he understands the perfection of the New Covenant and the Law of Love.

Marenbon, John. Pagans and Philosophers: The Problem of Paganism from Augustine to Leibniz.
(Princeton University Press, 2015).
112 See: “Therefore, by these words of blessed Augustine it is declared openly what true and
genuine love towards someone is, namely, to love him for his own sake, not for what he has. Finally, if I
love God because he loves me, and not because, whatever he does for me, he is someone who should be
loved above all things, then that saying of the Truth is spoken against me, “For if you love those who love
you, what reward will you have?” Certainly not the reward of righteousness, because I do not consider
the equity of the thing loved, but my advantage. And I might love another equally or more, if it profited
me equally or more; indeed, I might not love him if I did not look for my own advantage in him.” (Comm.
Rom. III. Question 4, 256)
111
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At the same time, though, he seems rather insistent that there are certain pagans who
lived exemplary lives prior to the coming of Christ. In effect, Abelard needs to find a
way to make love possible for those who do not know Christ, if he is consistent in
calling them excellent. The only way, it seems, to legitimate pagan virtue is to ascribe a
weak sort of charity to it—a general love of God. This is the move we see Abelard
making. There is evidence of this in the Problemata Heloissae:
It is in accord with piety and reason that whoever, recognizing by natural
law God as the creator and rewarder of all, adhere to him with such zeal
that they strive in no way to offend him through consent, which is the
proper name for sin: such people, we judge, should by no means be
damned; and what is necessary for them also to learn in order to be saved
will be revealed to them by God before the end of their lives either through
inspiration, or through someone sent by whom instruction may be given
about these things, as we read was done in the case of Cornelius about faith
in Christ and receiving baptism.113
He discusses this instance of Cornelius in Scito te Ipsum as well.
Cornelius did not believe Christ until Peter, when sent to him, taught him
about Christ. Although previously by the natural law he recognized and
loved (diligeret) God, and through this deserved to be heard in his prayer
and to have his alms accepted by God, yet if he had happened to depart
from this light before he believed in Christ, we should by no means dare to
promise him life however good his works seemed, nor should we number

The translation for this passage was included in John Marenbon’s Pagans and Philosophers: The
Problems of Paganism from Augustine to Leibniz, 92. The Latin from Victor Cousin, ed. adiuuante C. Jourdain
et E. Despois. Petri Abaelardi opera, tom.I, Paris 1849, 237-294 is.: “Pietati quippe atque rationi conuenit,
ut quicumque lege naturali creatorem omnium ac remuneratorem Deum recognoscentes, tanto illi zelo
adhaerent, ut per consensum, qui proprie peccatum dicitur, eum nitantur nequaquam offendere, tales
arbitremur minime damnandos esse, et quae illum ad salutem necessum est addiscere, ante uitae
terminum a Deo reuelari siue per inspirationem, siue per aliquem directum quo de his instruatur, sicut
inn Cornelio factum esse hegimus de fide Christi ac perceptione baptismi.”
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him with the faithful but with rather the unfaithful, however eagerly he
worked for salvation. (Sc. 64:15-23)114

Notice that in both passages Abelard insists that Cornelius had love or a strong
affection for God prior to receiving the Good News from Peter. This love allowed him
to excel in the natural law, so much so that God apparently considered him as a
contender to receive revelation of Christ. In fact, Abelard suggests this is why God sent
Peter: to teach Cornelius about Christ. So it seems that general knowledge of God is
enough to love God and thus, excel in the natural law. At the same time, though,
Abelard is careful in his word choice. He does not posit that Cornelius is virtuous,
praiseworthy, meritorious, or righteous. “However good his works seemed”
(quantumcunque bona opera eius viderentur), he says.
We receive a similar suggestion in Historia Calamitatum. Though Abelard clearly
holds philosophers in high regard, he also suggests some deficiency on their part:
The wise men among the pagans—the philosophers—were so named not
because of their knowledge but because of the character of their lives. To
gives examples of their sobriety and self-restraint would be teaching
wisdom to Minerva, but I will ask you this: if pagan and laymen could lead
such lives as these while bound by no religious calling, what should you
do—you, a cleric and a canon—to hold your sacred duties above your
pleasure, to keep yourself from plunging headlong into this Charybdis and
sinking irrevocably into sensuality and shame? If you care nothing for the
privilege of a cleric, if you hold God’s reverence in low esteem—if nothing
The Latin is: “Non credebat Cornelius in Christum donec Petrus ad eum missus de hoc ipsum
intruxit. Qui quamuis antea lege naturali Deum recognosceret atque diligeret, ex quo meruit de oratione
sua exaudiri et Deo acceptas elemosinas habere, tamen si eum ante fidem Christi de hac luce migrasse
contingeret, nequaquam ei uitam promittere audermus quantimcunque bona opera eius viderentur, nec
eum fidelibus sed magis infidelibus connumeraramus, quatocunque studio salutis esset occupatus.”
114
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else, at least defend the dignity of a philosopher and control this
shamelessness with self-respect.115
This passage is telling. Abelard is aware of the hypocrisy and lack of virtue among his
Christian brethren and impressed by the ability of pagans to temper their will, even
without the inspiration of Christ. However, he does not go so far as to claim that these
revered pagans are virtuous to the fullest extent. What appears to be praise in this
passage actually turns out to be a back-handed compliment. It is almost as if he
exclaims, “If you have no love of God, at the very least maintain the dignity of a
philosopher!” Embedded in this beautiful condemnation is the acknowledgment that
the philosophers have a knack for self-mastery; however, this is inferior to charity
which grounds the Christian life. Considering such evidence, Marenbon suggests that
Abelard might advocate a distinction between “virtue proper,” which requires charity,
and “true pagan virtue,” which is accessible without it.116
Even if Abelard does recognize the deficiency of pagan virtue, the suggestion
that pagans could excel in the natural law without explicit knowledge of the Incarnation

Trans. William Levitan, (Hackett, 2007), 17. The full Latin passage is in reference to a claim
Augustine makes describing what a philosopher is/was: “Hoc itaque loco cum dicitur "qui modo quodam
laudabilis uitae aliis praestare uidebantur, etc." aperte monstratur sapientes gentium, id est philosophos,
ex laude uitae potius quam scientiae sic esse nominatos. Quam sobrie autem atque continenter ipsi
uixerint, non est nostrum modo ex exemplis colligere, ne Mineruam ipsam uidear docere. Si autem sic
laici gentilesque uixerint nulla scilicet professione religionis astricti, quid te clericum atque canonicum
facere oportet, ne diuinis officiis turpes praeferas uoluptates, ne te praecipitem haec Charybdis absorbeat,
ne obcenitatibus istis te impudenter atque irreuocabiliter immergas? Qui si clerici praerogatiuam non
curas, philosophi saltem defende dignitatem. Si reuerentia Dei contemnitur, amor saltem honestatis
impudentiam temperet. Memento Socratem uxoratum fuisse, et quam fedo casu hanc philosophiae labem
ipse primo luerit, ut deinceps caeteri exemplo eius cautiores efbcerentur.”
116 Marenbon, Pagans and Philosophers, 89.
115
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trivializes the Passion of Christ and complicates Abelard’s atonement theory. It would
mean that love of God, generally speaking, is possible without the person of Christ—
without his communication of love manifested through his sacrificial death. In effect,
Abelard’s eagerness to sanctify pagan virtue downplays the subjective redemption from
sin which he insists is made possible through the person of Christ in the Romans
Commentary. In fact, Abelard’s entire appreciation for the New Covenant, in comparison
with the Law of Moses, is its ability to sanctify intention, again, because of charity
which is supposedly “aroused” by the Passion of Jesus. He argues for this rather
emphatically: “WHO DO NOT [WALK] ACCORDING TO [THE FLESH]. . . In us, I
say, it was fulfilled through Christ, in us who by his teaching and example and that
supreme display of charity were made spiritual, not carnal” (Comm Rom. III.8:4-5, 267).
As a result, Abelard’s insistence that the philosophers had love of God, generally
speaking, complicates his theological position substantially. If the philosophers could
love without the “supreme display of charity” Christ offers, why does Abelard place
such importance on the Passion as being necessary for subjective redemption from
concupiscence? In order for his theology to be consistent, Abelard would need to admit
either that Christ was either the best, but not the only, way to rouse one to such love or
that the philosophers simply had good works (or consents) but not virtue. Abelard is
unwilling to defend either of these positions wholeheartedly. However, there is more
textual evidence that he leans towards the latter.
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IV.

Conclusions
I have come full circle in offering an account of Abelardian ethics and dispelling

the popular Kantian appraisals that appear in the secondary literature. Almost every
question regarding Abelard’s ethics, and the theory of atonement that it rests upon, can
be traced back to charity—a movement of the soul toward God for his own sake. As a
result, Abelard’s ethics is unintelligible unless it is placed within a larger redemption
narrative. That narrative begins with the original sin of Adam, through which humanity
subjects itself to the dominion of sin. The Law of Moses is extended to the Israelites, but
it only makes the dominion increase ten-fold because it increases the awareness of one’s
fallenness and the preoccupation with reward and punishment—an obstacle to charity
and relationship. Such a preoccupation yields empty works, which are reflective of selfinterest. The Jews are promised a Messiah, who will release them from this slavery; the
Messiah comes in the person of Jesus Christ. In Christ, God perfectly communicates his
love through his willingness to take on human form and suffer a brutal death.
According to Abelard, all of this is with the intention of charity; it was to make the love
of God known to humanity. This sacrifice of Christ accomplishes a two-fold
redemption: redemption from original punishment and redemption from the subjective
dominion of sin that reigns in the form of concupiscence. Love, charity, is the only
release from this bondage, as it is the only force strong enough to overcome
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concupiscence. With the love of Christ comes the sanctification of intention—charity—
which grants substance and merit to our actions.
As a result, Abelard contends that virtue is only accessible through charity. It is
not a feat of self-mastery. It is not acquired through sheer habituation and force. It is not
the product of skill, afforded to those who have the privilege to be trained by great
mentors and to read the best philosophers. The person of Jesus extends an open
invitation for relationship. The cross is a testament to this love and affection that evokes
or “arouses” a loving response in those who choose to follow him. As a result, a
friendship is formed that begins the exodus out of slavery—from the bondage of selfinterest and obsession. This, for Abelard, is the true freedom of a Christian: the release
from the burden of law without love.
This account of atonement and redemption from sin is fairly reasonable and
consistent, until Abelard tries to incorporate the possibility of pagan virtue. By insisting
that the ancient philosophers possessed love of God, he muddies the centrality and
importance of Christ. At any rate, one thing is clear: human excellence is rooted in love.
Abelard insists that even the philosophers who lacked knowledge of Christ were only
able to achieve excellence because they had love for God.
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CONCLUSIONS

I.

Review of Argument
My central concern in this dissertation was to demonstrate that Abelard’s ethical

account is not proto-Kantian. I began in chapter two by showing the Augustinian
influence and context of Scito te Ipsum and Abelard’s Romans Commentary. I was
specifically interested in the Augustinian use of intention within Confessions, which has
indelible spiritual connotations. After considering Augustine’s use of intention, I
outlined Abelard’s “Gospel of Intention.” I argued that intention was the defining
feature of the New Covenant in Christ, which was made clear through Abelard’s
exegesis of Paul’s epistle to the Romans. Ultimately, I resolved that Abelard’s
understanding of intention is affective in nature and retains an Augustinian sense and
use.
This provided sufficient background context to distinguish Abelard’s use of
consent and intention in Scito te Ipsum, which I demonstrated in Chapter 2. Contrary to
most of the secondary literature on Abelard, I argued that consent and intention are not
interchangeable concepts. Consent is an agreeableness of the will—when one is ready to
perform an action and would not withdraw from doing so if the opportunity presented
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itself. Intention is the affection or desire motivating action. This is an important
distinction because consent can occur in opposition to desire. In addition, one can
consent to perform certain acts devoid of good intention. For instance, giving to the
needy with a desire to be perceived as pious.
In Chapter 3, I took the notion of “affective intentionalism” and used it to
challenge the popular Kantian construal of Abelard’s ethics. I argued that Abelard’s
ethics is not proto-Kantian in that it does not render affective inclination obsolete in
determinations of moral praise. Whereas Kant posits that rational principles are the loci
of moral praise, Abelard contends that charity—a movement of the soul towards God
for the sake of himself—is meritorious. As a result, Abelard’s ethics depends upon a
passion or desire for God; his ethics is not proto-Kantian. Finally, I suggested that
Abelard’s ethic does not fit neatly in any modern ethical categories. Instead, I claim, it
should be deemed an ethic of charity.
After considering, and dismissing, the Kantian reading, I further reinforced the
synthesis of the spiritual and the ethical by detailing Abelard’s account of the
atonement. Using the outlines provided by Thomas Williams and Phillip Quinn, I
provided a summary of the objective and subjective dominion of sin and corresponding
redemption. I claimed that both the objective and subjective redemption from sin
depend upon charity. In other words, charity is the means through which the merits of
Christ are transferred to individual believers and the means through which an
122

individual overcomes concupiscence. I conclude by trying to see how Abelard might fit
the possibility of pagan virtue into this charity-centric ethical account. Ultimately,
Abelard’s eagerness to attribute a weak sort of love for God to those outside the
Christian tradition raises serious questions about his theory of atonement, especially its
emphasis on subjective redemption, which apparently depends upon the passion of
Christ.
II.

Abelard’s Intentionalist Ethics?
From what I have argued, it is clear that the Kantian appraisal of Abelard’s ethics

is a mischaracterization. Though there are certainly deontological aspects of Abelard’s
account, appeals to them cannot sufficiently explain all that is going on in Scito te Ipsum.
What is going on then? Clearly, intention is a central theme of Abelard’s ethical and
theological writings. It features largely in both Scito te Ipsum and Abelard’s Romans
Commentary. The failure of many attempts to characterize Abelard’s intentionalism in
Scito te Ipsum results from the inability to bridge Abelard’s use of intention in these two
works. This is, in part, what I have accomplished in the work of this dissertation:
showing that there is, indeed, obvious continuity between Abelard’s affective use of
intention in the Romans Commentary and in Scito te Ipsum. In turn, this demonstrates the
continuity between his ethics and his theology. As a result, we can appropriately
characterize Abelard’s intentionalism, which I will now do.
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Because former interpreters gathered that consent and intention were
synonymous—used interchangeably throughout Scito te Ipsum—intention seemed to be
a word that could encompass the entirety of Abelard’s points made within his ethical
treatise. However, considering that intention is, in fact, distinct from consent, it only
reveals half the story. Abelard’s ethics is intentionalist insofar as he claims that
intention reveals the quality of our consents, good consents in particular. Abelard looks
to intention in order to discern if seemingly good works are actually good. This is not a
tool for our analysis of other humans, being that we are unable to know another man’s
heart. Instead, this is where Abelard believes that God searches to make his judgements.
While consent reveals what we are ready to do, intention reveals why we are ready to
do it. In opposition to a majority of the literature on this subject, Abelard’s
intentionalism is not about how an agent conceptualizes actions, not their plan to
perform and action, not their voluntariness, nor their rational justification. Abelard’s
intentionalism is affective; it is determined by what one desires. This is what should be
meant by attributing Abelard with an ethical intentionalism: An agent’s action is good if
it proceeds from charitable intention, bad if it proceeds from carnal or selfish intention.
III.

A Medieval Ethic of Authenticity?
There is a common narrative that continental philosophy perpetuates:

exitentialism is the mother of authenticity—a stark contrast to ethical legalism,
absolutism, and dogmatism that characterized the continental attitude throughout the
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Christendom of the Middle Ages and rationalism of the Early Modern period. 117 Though
some make room for the rare mystic who lived “authentically;” they are the exceptions
that slipped through the cracks of thick, Christian veneer. Phenomenology and its
emphasis on subjectivity usher in a new era with competing concerns. Heidegger makes
authenticity the center of subjectivity. Kierkegaard’s critique of the Dutch bourgeoise is
focused on the centrality of duty and lack of “passion” in cold, church pews. As the
evolution of this idea makes its way into the twentieth century, it takes on a distinct
Nietzschean character—a rejection of any objective value or law.118 Creation ex nihilo
becomes the source Truth, Goodness, and Beauty—the artist becomes the moral
exemplar. Charles Taylor deems this the new “ethic of authenticity.”119 Setting aside the
critiques of the Early Moderns, dogmatism, and rationalism, this general narrative
suggests that medieval Christendom was marked by a divorce of the inner and the
outer—it forced a conscious death of the true, genuine, or authentic subject. Because the

This sentiment is no doubt reflected in Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex, Jean Paul Sarte’s
Being and Nothingness, and Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals. Also, this critique about rigid legalism and
obsession with vain works becomes a popular pejorative trope against Catholics, medieval Catholicism in
particular, from the Protestant Reformation going forward.
118 Alasdair Macintyre argues this in After Virtue, (University of Notre Dame Press, 1984). He
claims, “In another way too Nietzchse is the moral philosopher of the present age” (114). He characterizes
Nietzsche in the following way: “The underlying structure of his argument is as follows: if there is
nothing to morality but expressions of will, my morality can only be what my will creates. There can be
no place for such fictions as natural rights, utility, the greatest happiness of the greatest number. I myself
must now bring into existence ‘new tables of what is good.’ We, however, want to become those we are—
human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves” (
114).
119 Charles Taylor says in Ethics of Authenticity, (Harvard University Press, 1991), 27: “Our moral
salvation comes from recovering authentic moral contact within ourselves […] Self-determining freedom
demands that I break the hold of all such external impositions and decide for myself alone.”
117
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Christian must suppress or disengage with the passions, she is incapable of being true
to herself, which presumes a static, “core self” that is curiously synonymous with
dynamic, mutable desires.
While there certainly is nothing like the Nietzschean ubermensch hiding
somewhere in a medieval manuscript, I am hesitant to accept the truth of this narrative.
Thinkers such as Abelard evidence the fact that there was, indeed, a sort of medieval
ethic of authenticity, so long as one defines authenticity as “a person who acts in
accordance with desires, motives, ideals, or beliefs that are not only hers (as opposed to
someone else’s), but that also express who she really is.”120 In what follows, I will
outline the general characteristics of this medieval conception of “authenticity” as
informed by my reading of Abelard’s ethics and the writings of his kindred
contemporaries, which I believe is reflected in the concept of intention.121 In doing so, I
will distinguish medieval authenticity from modern, existentialist conceptions.
It is first important to note that the general medieval worldview assumes a
human essence. A human being is not born as a tabula rasa, waiting to be impressed
upon by the world. Instead, the Christian metaphysical biology presumes a human
essence and supernatural telos. As a result, human beings cannot be fully explained in

Guignon, Charles, “Authenticity,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2014).
Eileen Sweeney alludes to this in “Abelard’s ‘Historia Calamitatum’ and Letters: Self as Search
and Struggle.” Poetics Today 28, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 303–36. She claims that Abelard’s Historia
Calamitatum reflects a search for his true self. Though, she claims that such a search is “modern” precisely
because it reflects concerns about authenticity. Sweeney even notices the underlying concern about
intentionality as the basis of authenticity.
120
121
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natural terms. As Erik Kenyon puts it, “human beings are metaphysical straddlers: we
have one foot in eternity and one foot in time. When it comes to the good life the task is
to live the best life is to live the best life for us, given the kind of thing we are.”122 In
effect, a human being is born with deep longings that push her towards the realization
of a specific, supernatural telos—union with God. Human actions are good or bad
insofar as they move human beings towards or away from this summum bonum. Thus,
the path to authenticity will look very different than the modern path: it first involves
recognition that because of what a human is, which will include the reality that certain
desires are licit and others are not. In other words, certain desires will move one
towards God and others will not. As a result, being authentic will involve acting in
conformity with deeper human longings that move one towards union with God.
Given this worldview, a medieval sort of authenticity does not involve shifting
through desires to discern which one’s are not the product of outside influence or which
belong to the core self. Instead, it can be understood as a movement towards
synthesizing the inner and the outer—of acting in such a way that expresses who one
really is, that is, in conformity with the human essence. This comes to the fore in
medieval philosophy and theology through the notion of intentionality. Intention is the
bridge that connects our desires with our actions; determines the orientation of the will

Kenyon, Erik, “From Augustine to Eriugena,” Cambridge Companion to Medieval Ethics. ed. by
Thomas Williams, (Cambridge University Press, 2018), 9.
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and puts our deepest longings into focus. It is, as Abelard contends, the root of human
action. When human action is motivated by one’s own desires, it is intentional. When a
human action is motivated by the deepest longing of the human heart—union with
God—that intention is one of charity, a movement towards God for his own sake. In
fact, from Augustine through Aquinas, this movement involves sustaining focus upon
God as the object of our desire. Hugh of St. Victor states it explicitly and succinctly:
We leave our father's house, when we put the whole world and all that it
contains right out of our thought and fix the whole intention of our souls
on things eternal only.123
He elaborates on this later, saying:
Wherever your delight is, there is also your thought, where your thought is
there is the dwelling of the inner man. For according to the inner man,
everyone is said to dwell in that place where he dwells in thought. They,
therefore, who find their delight in the vanity of this world, are
shipwrecked men within, though they may have the ark of faith.124
This seems as though it could have been plucked straight from Abelard’s Romans
Commentary. Like Abelard, Hugh also maintains that intention is a focused love, delight,
or affection. Moreover, a good, Christian intention is a focused love of God.
Consequently, when one lives in accordance with their truest, deepest desires one is
living an authentic human life. In this state one can claim that one’s exterior action is

Hugh of Saint-Victor, Selected Spiritual Writings, trans. a Religious of C.S.M.V., (Wipd & Stock,
2009). This passage is from Noah’s Ark, Book 4.13, 141.
124 Hugh of Saint-Victor, Noah’s Ark, Book 3.6, 104.
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actually a reflection of all one was created to be—a vessel of love in conformity with the
image of Christ.
In fact, according to the notion of medieval authenticity I am painting here, to
live only in the realm of the temporal would be to live inauthentically because it
presumes that one refuses to acknowledge the fundamental longing of humanity:
relation with God. Consequently, this would yield an infinite restlessness—moving
through a life with no purpose or end. In such a state human existence is marked by the
anxiety of ambiguity and distention, a reality that Simone de Beauvoir and Jean Paul
Sartre seem to acknowledge.125 Now, rigid legalism ensues when the Christian life
becomes one about law without love—a striving for perfection that does not implore
the divine aid of charity. In other words, when one fails to respond to and cultivate the
deepest desires of their heart, who one really is. If there is no love as the foundation of
law, it would certainly be onerous and potentially oppressive.
What I have sketched above challenges the denigrated, medieval narrative of
subjective oppression. Upon closer examination, it becomes clear that medieval ethics
and spirituality are marked by a pervasive concern with being true to oneself and one’s
desires. Though muted by the clamor of the world, God’s call for relationship is
constant. Only by responding to that call can one quench the insatiable desire for

I suggest this simply because of the content and titles of their works. Take, for instance, Simone
De Beauvoir’s Ethics of Ambiguity and Sartre’s plays Nausea and No Exit.
125
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infinite love and live the authentic, human life in pursuit of the supernatural end. In
effect, love allows one to claims one’s actions as one’s own; the heart becomes incarnate
through intentional action. Modern authenticity differs from medieval conceptions in
one way only: modern authenticity presumes no human essence endowed by God and
thus no distinction between licit and illicit desire. Consequently, modern authenticity
has no roots except for the whims of fleeting desires which comprise the core self.
Human beings are only left with the burden of choice and the consequences of those
choices which collectively constitute their being.
I decided to end with this suggestion for two reasons. First, I think it reflects the
nature of this project—the necessary consideration of medieval spirituality or theology
in order to understand medieval ethics. Through doing this—contextualizing medieval
ethics within the scope of medieval spirituality—the seeming rigidity of scholastic
ethics can be seen in a different light. Moreover, considering intention as the basis of a
medieval sort of authenticity reveals a fundamental concern throughout the Middle
Ages about enriching and properly ordering human desires, not extinguishing them all
together. The lends new readings of major medieval thinkers (that have not been
marred by an Enlightenment lens) which have already begun to surface in the
secondary literature in the past decade. I think this work is essential in continuing the
“work of retrieval” Taylor calls for in Ethics of Authenticity, providing a sketch for an
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objective sort of authenticity, which can forge new paths of exploration in
contemporary religious ethics.
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